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Abstract
Pension  systems may have a different impact on gender  under  the new and old rules, and the relative gains or
because women are  less likely than  men to work in  losses  of men and women  because of the reform.
formal  labor markets and earn  lower wages when they  The authors find that women do accumulate  private
do. Recent multipillar  pension reforms tighten the link  annuities that are only 30-40 percent those of men in the
between payroll contributions  and benefits, leading  new systems.  But this  effect is mitigated  by sharp
critics to  argue that they will hurt women.  In contrast,  targeting of the new public pillars toward low earners,
supporters of these reforms argue that it will help  many of whom are women, and by restrictions on
women  by the removal  of distortions that favored  men  payouts from the private  pillars, particularly joint
and the better  targeted redistributions  in the new  annuity requirements.  As a result of these transfers, total
systems.  lifetime retirement  benefits for women reach 60-80
To test these conflicting  claims and to analyze  more  percent those of men, and for "full career" women they
generally the gender effect of alternative pension  equal  or exceed  benefits of men. Also as a result, women
systems, James,  Edwards, and Wong examine  the  are the biggest gainers from the pension reform. For
differential impact of the new and old systems in three  women who receive  these transfers, female/male  ratios of
Latin American  countries-Argentina,  Chile, and  lifetime benefits  in the new systems exceed  those in the
Mexico.  Based on household  survey data, they simulate  old systems in  all three countries.  Private intra-household
the wage and employment histories  of representative  transfers from husband to wife  in the form of joint
men  and women,  the pensions  they are likely to generate  annuities  play the largest role.
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World Bank July 18,  2002.IThe Gender Impact of Pension Reform: A Cross-Country Analysis
The majority of old people  are women and poverty among the old is concentrated
among very old women.  Therefore, in designing a pension system and pension reform it
is essential  to  take  account of the  gender  impact.  Employment-based  old  age  systems
pose  a problem in this regard,  since women  are less  likely than men to work in  formal
labor markets  and earn lower wages  when they do.  Recent multi-pillar pension reforms
include  a  defined  contribution  (DC)  pillar  that  tightens  the  link  between  payroll
contributions  and  benefits,  which  leads  critics  to  argue  that  they  will  fail  to  protect
women.  In contrast,  supporters  of these reforms  argue  that multi-pillar  systems remove
distortions  that  favored  men  and  permit  a  more  targeted  public  pillar  that  will  help
women.  They hypothesize  separating  the redistributive  and earnings-related  parts of the
systems  into  two  pillars-one  DC  and  one  DB-makes  the  new  DB  smaller,  more
transparent and more redistributive toward low earners such as women.
In  order  to  test  these  conflicting  claims  about  multi-pillar  reforms,  this  paper
examines  the differential  impact on the two  genders of the new and old systems  in three
Latin  American  countries-Chile,  Argentina  and  Mexico.  Based  on household  survey
data, we simulate  the wage and employment histories of representative men and women,
and the pensions that these are likely to generate under the new and old rules.'  Our basic
intent is to examine the gender impact of alternative pension  system designs, with policy
implications  that  would  apply  more  broadly.  While  both  efficiency  and  equity
considerations  are involved, our emphasis  is on relative rather than absolute changes,  on
distributional  rather than efficiency effects.
We ask four basic questions:
1.  What  are  the  relative  monthly  and  lifetime  benefits  of men  versus  women
under the new systems?
2.  What  are the relative  gains  or  losses of men versus women,  due to the  shift
from the old to the new systems?
3.  Which sub-groups within each gender benefit or lose the most from the reform
and from redistributions under the new systems?
4.  What are the key policy choices that determine these gender outcomes?
2Most basically:  We find that women do indeed accumulate retirement  funds and
private annuities that are only 30-40% those of men, from the DC pillar of the multi-
pillar systems. However,  this effect is mitigated by targeting of the new public pillars
toward low earners, many of  whom are women, and by restrictions  on payout  provisions,
particularly joint  annuity  requirements.  Women  are  the  major  recipients  of
redistributions  from these two sources. As a result, total lifetime retirement benefits for
women reach 60-80% of those  for men and  for 'full career" married  women they equal
or exceed benefits of men.  Also  as a result,  women are the biggest gainers  from  the
pension reform. For women  who receive these transfers, female/male ratios of lifetime
benefits in the new systems exceed those in the old systems in all three countries. Private
intra-household transfers through joint  annuities,  which  are  required or  strongly
encouraged, play the largest  role in equalizing  gender ratios.
Different  sub-groups  within  each  gender  benefit  differentially  from  the  new
systems.  Low  earners  of  both  genders  benefit  disproportionately  from  targeted
redistributions  in all  three  countries.  Married  women who  work in the  labor force  gain
substantially  from the joint annuity, which they get in addition to their own pension.  In
Chile and Mexico, those who work the most gain the most. But in Argentina women who
specialize  in  home  production  are  subsidized  through  the  public  pillar.  Women  are
allowed  to retire  early, a "privilege"  that cuts  the monthly pensions  of those who do so
more than it did  in the old  system.  Correspondingly,  those  who retire later get  a larger
reward  in the  new system.  Women  who live  though periods of prolonged  slow growth
receive more protection but future cohorts of women will receive less protection  against
gender  inequality,  under  present indexation  rules.  These  differences  mean that gender-
based  equity crosscuts  with  other criteria  for  equity,  so pension  reformers  must think
about  which  women  and  families  have  priority  needs  for  redistributions.  Moreover,
transfers  and  taxes  become  incentives,  so  policy-makers  must  think  about  which
behaviors they want to encourage  as efficient.
These differential  outcomes stem from four major design  features that we discuss
in detail:
o  Relative retirement  ages for men and women;
o  Targeting and eligibility conditions for the public pillar;
3*  Indexation provisions;  and
*  Restrictions  on  payouts--in  particular,  survivors'  benefits  and  joint  annuity
requirements.
These  are the  design features  upon which policy-makers  concerned  with gender impact
should focus.
Part  I starts  with an  outline of how  men  and women  typically  differ,  and how
alternative pension systems might therefore be expected to affect them differentially. Part
II  describes  the  multi-pillar  reforms  in  Latin  America,  with  particular  reference  to
provisions  that have differential  gender  impacts, and summarizes our methodology.  Part
m simulates  expected annuities for men and women from the new private pillar. Parts IV
and V  analyze how this  is modified  by public  transfers  and by annuitization  rules that
create private transfers,  and discuss the  different  approaches  to  and trade-offs  between
equality  and work incentives.  Part VI  evaluates which  groups  gained and lost the most
from the shift to a new  system. Part VII briefly compares  the outcomes in Latin America
with  those  in  the  transition  economies,  where  the  policy  choices  have  been  quite
different.  The Conclusion points to key design features that determine the gender impact
of pension reform, applicable to other regions as well.
This paper focuses on women who are in the formal social security system. Many
women, particularly  in rural areas,  are not in the system at all. While some are protected
by the joint annuity, many members  of this group are dependent  on the extended  family
for support,  supplemented  by social assistance.  How non-contributory  schemes  can best
be structured  to benefit those who  need it-without incurring  high costs or tax  evasion
and crowding  out personal  saving  or family support-is  a vital  question that should be
the topic of another study.
I. Why Do Pension  Systems  and Pension Reforms Have a Gender Impact?
Most  public  pension  programs-both  the traditional  DB  and the  newer  multi-
pillar plans--  are contributory,  based heavily on labor market experience.  Workers  pay
payroll  taxes and  receive  benefits that depend  on wage history,  years of work,  or more
4directly  on  their  contributions.2 These  social  security  systems  have  developed  for  a
variety of reasons:
o  If benefits  are linked to earnings  and contributions, workers may be willing to
contribute  over  and  above  the  taxes  they would  otherwise  pay,  since  they
perceive  this as  a payment  for private  services  that  are  earmarked  for  them
rather than a tax for the provision of public goods.
O  They may be less likely to evade these contributions, a consideration which is
particularly  important  in  developing  countries  where  tax  enforcement
mechanisms are weak.
o  Payroll taxes are relatively easy to collect, particularly from large employers.
O  Pensions  are  viewed  as  a  source  of income  that replaces  part of the wage,
when  old  age  makes  work  difficult  or  less productive,  hence  a connection
between pension benefits and wages seems logical.
However,  these  contributory  employment-based  systems  pose  a  problem  for
women, who are less likely to have worked  and contributed for many years, have earned
lower wages  when  working,  and are  likely  to  outlive  their husbands  who  provide  the
family  income.  As  a  result  of these  socio-economic  and  demographic  differences,  the
same pension policy may have different effects  on men and women and pension reform
can have important gender effects.  Moreover, social  security systems often include rules
that reflect these social norms and explicitly differentiate between men and women.
ffffeeireltisaR Esbor foirce hifstolrie
Labor force participation  rates. Women traditionally have  less continuous  labor
force  attachment  than  men.  The intra-family  division of labor has  typically resulted  in
men working in the market, women in the home.  Even when women work in the market,
this attachment tends to be temporary and part-time. It is more likely to be in the informal
sector,  which is not covered by formal social security schemes.  Women's work may be
interrupted to have children and raise them,  care for elderly parents or sick members  of
the family,  etc.  These behaviors  may be thought of as voluntary individual decisions,  or
as the result of social norms over which the individual has limited control. In either case,
the  consequence  is  that  women,  especially  married  women,  are  in  the  system  for  far
fewer  years  over their  lifetimes-roughly  50-70%  as  many  years  in  our  three  sample
5countries (Table 3). Although  women's labor market experience  is converging to that of
men, the process is gradual and traditional roles continue to dominate in many developing
countries.3
Wages. Women typically earn less per week or year of work than men, even after
controlling  for age  and  education.  This may be  due in  part  to  their lower  labor force
attachment  (past  experience  and  expected  future  tenure),  in  part  to  occupational
segregation,  and in  part  to  social  norms  that  condone  lower  pay  to  women.  In  our 3
sample  countries,  at  age  20  women  earn  almost  as  much  as  men,  but  the  disparity
increases  with  age and by age  50 they  earn  only  60-70%  as  much per  month of work
(Table  4). The combination of fewer years of work and lower wage rates means  that any
pension system that links benefits to earnings or contributions is likely to cover a smaller
percentage of women and to produce lower benefits for women.4
Different retirement ages for men and women.  Rules of the system often allow
women to retire  earlier  than  men. For example,  women  are permitted  to  retire 5 years
earlier than men in Chile and Argentina.  This enables  them to retire at the same time as
their  husbands,  who tend to  be several  years older.  Early retirement  may  seem  to be  a
privilege-that women who  derive  disutility from work  appreciate--but  it is a privilege
that costs  in terms of lower pension rights  eamed.  This cost may not be  fully realized
until the woman is too old to reverse her decision to retire  early.  It may also  discourage
employers  from hiring or promoting older  women,  for fear they will retire  soon.  These
differential  rules  started  in  traditional  DB  systems  and  they  frequently  continue  in
reformed systems-but the penalty  for early retirement  is greater in a DC  system that is
actuarially fair.
Demographic  and biological  differences
Longevity.  Besides  these  labor  market  and  policy  differences  are  important
demographic-biological  differences  between men and women.  Women at  age 60 have  a
life expectancy that is 3-5 years greater than that of  men, in most countries.  In Chile a 60-
year-old women  is likely to live another 23 years, while a 60-year-old man lives  another
19 and a 65-year-old man lives another  15.5.  A woman who retires at age 60 has a future
lifespan  in retirement  that is 7.5  years more than that of her husband, when he retires at
age  65. Thus  annuitization,  that provides  longevity  insurance,  is especially  important to
6women.  But  any  given  DC  accumulation  yields  lower  annual  benefits  to  women,
especially  if gender-specific  tables  are  used,  as  in  Latin  America.  Widowhood.  The
greater longevity of women also means that they are more likely to become widows than
men  are  to  become  widowers;  hence  survivors'  pensions  are  of key  importance  to
women.  The  social  custom  for  husbands  to  be  older  than  wives  exacerbates  this
importance of survivors'  benefits.  In Chile women in urban areas were almost as likely as
men  to  receive  a pension.  However,  for  women  the  pension  is  a widow's  or  social
assistance  pension in  almost half the  cases,  while  for men  it is almost always  an own-
earned  pension.  In  Mexico  the  disparity  is even  greater  (Table  2).  Without  survivors'
benefits, non-working widows are likely to find themselves without monetary means and
even widows  who have  a pension  of their  own find their household  income  cut by far
more  than  their cost of living when their husband  dies, due  to  scale  economies.  As  a
result of women's greater longevity, during which they outlive their husbands  and use up
their  family  savings,  poverty  among the  old  tends  to  be concentrated  among  women,
when they are very old-unless provisions  are included making that outcome less likely.
Survivors'  benefits  are  often  included  in  social  security  systems,  but  the  precise
arrangements vary. Joint annuities play a major role in the new Latin American systems.
IlmRlCadtns fo r mnunlftiPRlIr  wrefoirm
Given this as background,  we conjecture that recent reforms that were designed to
link  benefits  more  closely  with  contributions  will  produce  lower  own-pensions  for
women,  especially  women  who  specialize  in  home-work.  Of course,  in  pure  defined
contribution  systems,  a lower  pension  is directly  attributable  to  lower contributions,  if
men and women have both been subject to the  same rate of return on investments.  In
this  sense,  lower  pensions  for  women  might  be  interpreted  as  "equal  treatment."
However, it also may signal a very low standard of living for older women, which social
security was designed to avoid.
In  part  to  mitigate  this  eventuality,  all  multi-pillar  systems  contain  "public"
defined benefit elements,  usually financed by general revenues,  which deviate from pure
defined  contribution.  We  hypothesize  that  these  generate  transfer  payments  that  favor
women,  but detailed  arrangements  such as degree of targeting to  low earners,  eligibility
7rules,  retirement  age  and  indexation  provisions  dictate  which  women benefit  and how
much.
The  Latin  American  reforms  also  contain  elaborate  restrictions  at  the  payout
stage,  especially  regarding  annuitization,  that  redistribute  between  the  genders.  We
expect  that  the  common  requirement  of survivors'  benefits  and  joint  annuities  will
generate  an important  intra-family  redistribution toward women,  including  women who
have not worked  in the formal  labor market themselves.  In most European  countries  as
well  as the US, unisex tables are required  for employment-related  annuities,  to equalize
annual  pension  amounts  despite  gender  differences  in  life  expectancy.  This  is not  yet
required in Latin America.  We  examine  the degree  to which joint annuities  serve  as an
alternative to unisex tables.
Finally,  the new systems replaced pay-as-you-go DB systems where contributions
and benefits were only loosely linked. The old systems favored women in some ways but
hurt them in others;  thus the net  impact of the change  I uncertain  a priori.  We examine
this question empirically.  We  also briefly  compare  the gender impact of the reforms  in
Latin America with that in the transition  economies, where policy choices  and outcomes
appear to be quite different
II Background, Data and Methodology
To investigate  more precisely the impact of pension  reform on men and women, we
carried  out  a  detailed  simulation  of the  old  and new systems  in  three Latin  American
countries-Chile,  Argentina and Mexico. All three countries adopted multi-pillar reforms
that had as  their foundation  the  funded  DC  pillar  from  which all participants  get  very
similar rates  of return. This inevitably means that women receive lower annual pensions
than  men,  due  to  their  less  continuous  employment  histories,  lower  wages,  earlier
retirement  and  longer  life  expectancy.  However,  this  outcome  is  modified  by
redistributions  that  occur  through  the  public  pillar  and  by annuitization  arrangements
during the payout stage.  Each new system includes a public DB that takes the form of a
minimum pension guarantee (MPG) in Chile, a "social quota"  (plus an MPG) in Mexico,
8and a flat benefit in Argentina. Each country restricted payout arrangements.  We focus on
urban workers, because social security coverage in rural areas is very limited.
113riefr descrAijfons of tlhe  new systems
Chile. In  1981 Chile replaced a mature traditional  government-run pay-as-you-go
defined  benefit  system  with  a  new  multi-pillar  system  that  included  a  defined
contribution  pillar  buttressed  by  a public  pillar  in  the  form  of a minimum  pension
guarantee  (M1PG).  The old system was insolvent, having promised benefits that exceeded
contributions,  with  the  disparity  differing  across  individuals  in  uneven  ways  that
encouraged  evasion.  The  object  of the reform  was  to make  the system  largely  funded
(except  for the MPG),  and therefore fiscally sustainable;  to link benefits more closely to
contributions,  thereby reducing  the tax element and the incentive to evade;  and to make
the redistributive element very explicit and targeted.
A new system of private pension funds (AFP's) was started, that competed for the
mandatory payroll contributions  of workers.  These contributions are  10%  of payroll  for
investment  plus about 3%  for administrative  fees  and requisite premiums  for disability
and survivors insurance (all data on administrative  and insurance costs are from James et
al 2000 and 2001).  Affiliation with the new system is mandatory  for new employees in
the  labor force,  voluntary  but encouraged  for workers  already in the labor  force at the
date of the reform and for the self-employed.  Almost all employees  are now in the new
system. Upon retirement  (age  65 for men, 60 for women),  workers  can draw upon their
accumulated  savings  in  the  form  of  gradual  withdrawals  that  are  spread  over  both
spouses'  lifetimes or an annuity that had to be joint for married men. (Earlier retirement
and  lump  sum  distributions  are  permitted  if the  account  balance  is  large  enough  to
finance  an annuity  that exceeds  a specified  floor).  All medium  and long-term  financial
transactions,  including  annuities,  are  price-indexed  in  Chile,  and  many  indexed
instruments  are  traded.  Those  who  have  worked  at  least  20  years  are  guaranteed  a
minimum  pension  (MPG)  that  is  financed  from  general  revenues.  The  MPG  is  not
formally indexed but so far has risen over time faster than prices, on par with wages,  on
an ad hoc basis. It is based purely on the individual's own pension, without taldng other
income or family circumstances  into account.5
9Argentina. With  some important variations  that are described  below, the Chilean
scheme  was  emulated  in  Mexico  and  Argentina,  as  well as  other  Latin  American  and
transitional  countries.  Argentina  added  several  new  wrinkles.  First of all,  instead of a
minimum pension  guarantee  Argentina provides  a basic "flat"  benefit.  It was  originally
financed  by  a  payroll  tax,  but  later  other  more  general  tax  revenues  were  partially
substituted.  Since this is paid to all eligible workers it is much more costly than the MPG
in Chile. To help keep costs under control, eligibility is restricted to workers with at least
30 years  of contributions-a provision that excludes most women.  As an alternative that
applies  mainly to women, workers who reach  age 70 with  10  years of contributions  are
granted a reduced flat pension that is 70% of the regular amount.  The flat benefit is not
formally indexed and  so far has remained constant over time.  Given the fiscal problems
that  Argentina has  been  experiencing  in  recent  years,  its  public  pillar has  been under
major revision and the government is considering tightening eligibility conditions for the
reduced  flat.  However,  since  the  revisions  are  still in  flux  our analysis  focuses  on the
benefit structure that was set up in 1994.
In addition to the basic benefit,  11%  of payroll  is contributed  to a second pillar.
Here  the  worker  has  a  choice  between  a "public"  DB  pillar  (called  PAP)  that  is  a
downsized  version of the old public system,  and a "private"  pillar that is similar to the
Chilean  model.  PAP  is  available  only  to  workers  with  more  than  30  years  of
contributions;  all  contributions  are  lost  for  workers  who  contribute  for  less  than  30
years-so  it  is  particularly  inappropriate  to  women  As  of  2001,  over  80%  of  all
contributors were in the private rather than the public second pillar. Consequently, in this
paper  we  focus  on  the  private  option.  In  the  private  pillar,  workers  choose  among
numerous investment managers  (AFJP's) and pensions depend on amounts accumulated.
Administrative  fees  and survivors  and disability insurance  fees,  amounting  to 3.25%  of
payroll, are covered out of the  11% contribution,  leaving  a net of 7.75%  for investment.
Upon retirement  (age 65 for men, 60 for women), the accumulated assets are taken out in
the form  of gradual withdrawals,  annuities  (joint annuity with 70% to survivor) or lump
sum for amounts in excess of a specified floor.
Mexico.  In Mexico  a contribution  of 6.5%  of payroll  is made to  the individual
accounts  in  the  funded  pillar.  (Disability  and  survivors  insurance  while  working  are
10financed  separately).  As in Chile,  workers  have  a  choice  among  investment managers,
known  as  AFORES  in  Mexico.  Retirement  income  is  fuirther  augmented  by  a  5%
contribution of each worker's wage to a housing fund,  INFONAVIT. If the money in the
account  is  not  borrowed  to  finance  the  purchase  of a home,  it  becomes  part  of the
worker's retirement assets.6 Upon retirement at age 65 for both genders, married workers
have a choice between  a gradual  withdrawal  spread over both spouse's lifetimes  and a
joint annuity.
The  state  contributes  toward  the  finances of this system  in three ways:  First,  it
pays  a  flat  "social  quota"  (SQ)  equal  to  5.5%  of one  daily minimum  wage  to  each
account  for each  day of work.  The  SQ is price-indexed  (as is the minimum wage)  but
initially it was  2.2% of the average  wage, a percentage  that will decline  as wages  rise
faster than prices over time. Adding the SQ to the worker's  6.5% contribution brings the
total gross  contribution  of the  average-wage  worker to  8.7%  and  the net contribution,
after subtracting administrative  expenses, to 6.8% (plus some part of INFONAVIT).  The
SQ  is designed  to  increase  the  accounts  of low-income  workers  and the  incentive  for
informal sector workers to join the system. It is financed out of general revenues.  Second,
workers are guaranteed  a minimum pension, initially equal to the minimum wage or 40%
of the average  wage,  indexed to  inflation, providing they had 25  years of contributions.
Third,  although  affiliation  to  the new  system  is mandatory  in Mexico,  workers  in  the
labor force  at the date  of the reform  were  guaranteed  the right to  opt back  into the old
system upon retirement.  In this paper we focus  on new workers who  are not entitled to
this opt-back provision.
Table  1 presents  a  brief  summary  of the  new  and  old  systems  in  the  three
countries  and  Table  2  presents  some key  data on  wages,  employment  and  retirement
income.
MehonodoROY
Analysis of how women  fare  relative to  men in the new  and old social  security
systems is made difficult by a number of factors.  First, the new system has not been in
effect  long  enough  to  be  mature.  That  is,  current  retirees  in  Chile  and  Argentina  are
subject to a mixture of old and new system benefits (the fonner in the form of  recognition
bonds and compensatory pensions)  and we don't know for sure how someone will fare in
11the future  who  is  fully under  the  new system.  In Mexico  almost  everyone  has retired
under old-system rules, given the short period for building up individual  accounts and the
option current workers have  to revert to the old system upon retirement.  Moreover, in all
three  cases  we  don't  know  what  the  rate  of  wage  growth  and  rate  of  return  on
investments,  upon which DC benefits depend,  will be in the future.  Along similar lines,
longitudinal  data are not available. Thus, we could not use actual employment histories of
current retirees and workers to estimate their retirement accumulations  and entitlements.
Construction of representative men and women.  We  solved  these  problems  by
constructing  synthetic  men  and women-using  cross-sectional  data  on  current behavior
of people  at  different  ages,  educational  levels  and  marital  status  to  proxy  the lifetime
employment,  wage  and contribution histories  of "typical" persons in each  category.  We
then simulated  how  the  average man  and woman in each category would  fare under the
rules of the old and new systems,  given  these histories.7 While we focus on the average
person  in  each  category,  we  also make  some  attempt  to  estimate  the dispersion  within
each  cell.  Five  educational  levels  are  presented,  ranging  from  incomplete  primary  to
several years of post-secondary.  The modal group has full secondary  education  in Chile,
incomplete secondary in Argentina and primary education  in Mexico  (Appendix A). With
the exception of young women in Chile, fewer than a quarter of our sample had  any post-
secondary  education.  We use education as a proxy for "permanent  income."
This  methodology  assumes  that  age-specific  labor  force participation  and wage
behavior will remain constant through time (except  for secular wage  growth),  separately
for each schooling level. We interpreted these  as age effects rather than cohort  effects. In
reality, cohort effects are undoubtedly involved. Female labor force participation rates are
strongly  positively  correlated  with  education,  and  educational  levels  have  been  rising
dramatically  over  time  (Table  3).  This  means  that  aggregate  female  labor  force
participation  rates  will  also  rise  through  time.  Changing  social  norms  may  lead  to
additional  increases  in  female  employment  probabilities  within  each  educational
category.  Moreover,  the work  incentives  and disincentives  in the new  pension  systems
may alter work habits.
These potential changes in age-specific  female labor force participation rates were
not taken into account. However,  in addition to the "average" woman in each educational
12group,  we  also  calculated  pensions  for "ten-year  women"  who  worked  only ten  years
prior  to  child-bearing  and  "full  career  women"  who  had  the  same  labor  force
participation  as men. Full career women give us an indication of the impact of increasing
age-  and education-specific  labor  force participation  rates.  The  absence  of longitudinal
data  meant  that  we could  not  vary  wages  as  a function  of experience  so the  lifetime
earnings and pensions of full career women are probably understated.
Our representative  men and women are assumed to be single until the median age
of marriage in each country, and married thereafter. They marry within their educational
class, and the average husband is three years older than the wife. Thus we do not model
women who  remain  single  throughout  their  lifetimes,  because  of small  sample  size  of
single women in some age-educational  cells. Since  single women probably have a greater
labor force attachment than married women,  our simulations  for full career women may
give us a rough approximation of  their lifetime earnings and benefits.
Data. In  constructing  our synthetic men  and women, we used national data sets
for urban  areas  (see Appendix  B on data sources).  These data do not coincide precisely
with groups that are actually covered by the social security system.  Some social security
affiliates live in rural areas while some urban residents are not covered by social security.
In Chile our data cover only those affiliated to social security,  which means they were in
the  system  at  some  points  in  their  lives.  This  helps  explain  why  the  labor  force
participation  rates of women appear to be higher in Chile than in Argentina and Mexico,
where  all urban  workers  are  included.  These  data  may understate  wages  and  work of
women who were covered  by social security and therefore  overstate the pension gender
differential  in Argentina and Mexico for this  group.  Also in Chile the wage  and work
data primarily  cover  full  time  workers  while  in Argentina  and Mexico  they cover full
time plus part  time workers.  Thus  full  time equivalent  years  are  smaller  and full  time
wages  are larger  for urban working  women than  the numbers given  for the latter two
countries.  We attributed  all working time as contributing time, but it is quite  likely that
part of this work is outside the formal labor sector and the social security system-these
data  would  then  overestimate  lifetime  contributions,  especially  for  women.  For  this
reason we may have underestimated  the gender differential  in pensions  for the  average
woman  stemming  from  the private  pillar.  However,  this  bias  will probably  diminish
13age and age of death vary by gender and country and benefits from the joint annuity start
flowing to widows late in old age.
The counterfactual. In Parts III-V we discuss the new systems only, so there is no
counterfactual.  In Part  VI we apply the DB  formulae of the old  systems  to assess  the
gender  impact of the  new versus  the  old  systems.  This introduces  an additional  set of
methodological problems.  The old systems were actuarially unbalanced so could not have
delivered  their promised  benefits  in the  long or medium  term.  Argentina  was already
defaulting  on  its payments.  What,  then,  is  the  counterfactual  to the  new  system?  We
avoid  this  problem by applying  the  DB  formulae  that were  in place just prior  to  the
reform,  and focusing on relative rather than absolute gains and losses to different gender-
education-marital  groups.  Thus  we  abstract  from  efficiency  effects  that  might  lead
everyone to be better or worse off. Instead we ask: Which groups gained or lost the most
from the reform? Did gender ratios improve or deteriorate? hnplicitly, this is tantamount
to  a  counterfactual  in which  the  fiscal  adjustment  to  insolvency  in the  old  systems  is
distributionally neutral,  involving equi-proportional  benefit cuts or tax increases for each
group, while leaving relative positions  unchanged.9
Taxes.  Throughout,  this analysis  concentrates  on the benefit  side  rather than the
finance  side,  because  we  don't  know  what  the  full  cost  of  the  public  pillar,  its
intergenerational  burden  or its  gender  incidence  will  turn out to be,  either  in the  old or
new  systems. Our comments  on net  redistributions  (transfers minus  taxes)  are based  on
the assumption that within each cohort, the tax burden is distributed roughly proportional
to earnings.
111.  Aaunnaie5 Tor Men animd WomeEn from  the ]Private  Pffligar
Work  anim  wage experiiece  of  men versus womenm
Based on our cross-sectional  analysis we find  that, on  average,  women  affiliates
in Chile work  and contribute to  the system  only 70%  as many years  as men  (Table 3).
Using secondary  school graduates  as an example, by the time they reach the age of 65 the
average  male affiliate  has  contributed  38  years  while  the  average  female  affiliate  has
contributed only 27 years.  In Argentina men tend  to work more and women less,  so the
relative  experience  of women  is lowerO% for secondary  school  graduates  and  less
15than 50%  for the majority who  didn't even  finish secondary  school.  In Mexico, too,  the
gender  ratio  of experience  is less  than  50%.  In  all  cases,  the  experience  disparity  is
smaller  for young women,  before they marry. Also in  all cases  the gender gap  narrows
substantially for the minority with higher  education but it never completely  disappears.
By the  age of 65,  the average  woman without  a university degree  in all these countries
has accumulated  18-27  years of experience,  while the average  man has accumulated 38-
44.
In  all  three  countries  younger  women  who  work  earn  almost  as  much  as  men
(Table  4).  However,  earnings  diverge  as  they  age-the  age-earnings  profile  is  much
steeper for men-perhaps  because of the returns to experience.  Prime age male earnings
profiles  rise  2-3%  per  year while  female  profiles  rise  1-2%per  year.  Thus, by the  time
they reach age 50,  women earn barely 60% as much as men per month worked,  in most
educational  categories.  For example,  a Chilean man with a secondary  degree  age 46-50
earns US$535  monthly, while a comparable  woman  earns $326.  The pattern is similar in
Mexico,  although  absolute  amounts  are  lower.  In Argentina  a male  secondary  school
graduate  in his  late 40's  earns  US$1105  while  a comparable  female  earns  $666.  (Our
Argentinean data are from 1996-97 and use  1997 exchange rates. At 2002 exchange rates
these  amounts would  be only  25-30%  as high-much closer to Mexico.  The  choice of
exchange  rates  should  not  affect  gender  ratios).  While  highly  educated  women  work
almost as much as men, their monthly earnings do not converge and, in fact, they diverge
further in the highest educational category in Chile.'0
Gender ratios in pension  accumulations and monthly own-pensions
We now proceed to estimate the gender ratio of retirement  savings  and annuities
under the new system (Table  5).  In this  section we discuss  the pure DC plan, based on
contributions  by  workers  and  employers.  (In  Mexico  we  exclude  the  government's
contribution,  the  social  quota).  We  would  expect  women's  simulated  retirement
accumulations  to  be  far  lower  than  those  of  men,  as  a  result  of lower  labor  force
participation  and lower earnings  while working.  Converting these  accumulations  into an
annuity, women's benefits will be further depressed by their greater longevity--but this is
offset  by the  fact  that  married  men  who  annuitize  must  purchase  a joint  annuity  that
covers their wife's life as well as their  own. We would further expect women's annuities
16to  be  relatively the  highest in  Chile,  where  their relative  labor force  participation  and
eamings are highest, and lowest in Mexico for the converse reason. In fact, we find that
the average  woman ends up with an own-annuity that is approximately the same in Chile
and Mexico--30-50%  that of the average man--and less than 30% in Argentina (Figure 1).
Mexico  jumps ahead of Argentina  and on par with  Chile because  it has decreed equal
retirement ages (65)  for men and women, unlike the other countries.  These ratios rise at
higher  educational  levels,  because  of the  positive  correlation  between  education  and
female  labor  force  participation.  Gender ratios  are  all  a bit higher  in the  slow growth
scenario,  where  wage  differentials  and  pension  accumulations  remain  more
compressed.'1
HmleaCt of retiremeimt  gEe om owa-zaimuMiie
Equality of retirement  age  for men and women is the main  reason why Mexico
has  the  same  gender  ratio  as Chile,  despite  its lower  female  work  experience.  If we
postponed  the  age  of annuitization  for women  to  65  (equality with  men) in Chile  and
Argentina,  this  would  raise  their  monthly  annuity  by  almost  50%,  even  with  work
experience unchanged,  because interest accumulates  for five years more and the annuity
is paid for  five years  less.  This  is the major policy change  that would raise women's
monthly own-annuities.  But even full career women who work as much as men get only
65-75%  as much as men because  of large wage disparities.  The unavoidable conclusion:
policy regarding  retirement  age  is very important,  but even with equal retirement  ages,
own-pensions  from the DC pillar will be far lower for women than for men, due to their
lower labor force participation and wage rates, as well as their greater longevity.
NIV.  IEnm pac1 of  nramifers ffrom nhe pnble  piARiDr
However, this wide disparity in own-pensions  is narrowed  by transfers that occur
through the  public  pillar-- the minimum pension  guarantee  (MPG)  in Chile,  the social
quota  (and MPG) in Mexico  and the flat pension in Argentina-and by restrictions  on
payouts  in  the  private  pillar,  especially  the  joint  annuity.  These  transfers  raise  the
female/male  ratio  of total  retirement  income  and  produce  a higher  rate  of return  on
contributions  for women than for men. Each country reflects a different ethos in its public
17pillar:  poverty-prevention  in  Chile,  equalization  but  at  different  levels  for those  with
weak and strong labor force attachment  in Argentina,  and equal pensions for equal work
in  Mexico.  Also,  these  public  pillars  have  very  different  costs  and  different  cost-
containment  techniques,  which  impact  women  in particular.  Chile's  narrowly targeted
MPG is the least  expensive  and it raises  the gender ratio  only for women in the  lowest
group;  Mexico's  work-related  SQ  increases  gender ratios in  all  educational  categories,
but  by  smaller  amounts;  and  Argentina's  flat  benefit  raises  gender  ratios  more
substantially in all income groups-but only after age 70, and at the greatest cost. Each of
these public  pillars redistributes  to low  educational  groups,  especially to  the women  in
each group, and women who are eligible  for the public benefit consequently end up well
above the poverty-line  (Table 6 and Figure 2).
Low  lifetime  earnings  stem  from  a)  low  wage  rates  and/or  b)  low  work
experience.  Targeting  toward  low  earners  may  therefore  reward  low  labor  force
participation. Each country has chosen a different way to deal with this potential trade-off
between equality  and poverty-prevention  on the one hand versus  work incentives on the
other  hand.  This  shows  up  in  differing  eligibility  rules,  work-benefit  linkages  and
retirement  age  provisions.  As  a  result,  they  provide  different  relative  subsidies  to
different sub-groups of women, particularly to those who specialize in home-work versus
formal labor market work.
Chile's MPG
The MPG as an income floor. The MPG sets a floor on the real value of pensions
of workers who qualify by attaining 20 years of contributions.  The MPG floor in  1994,
the  year  our data  were  gathered,  was  $91  per  month,  about  27%  of the  average  male
wage,  37%  of the  average  female  wage  and  125%  of the poverty  line  at  that time.  In
effect,  it truncates the  lower tail of the pension  distribution.  Since  it goes  (only) to  the
least  well  off  (among  those  in  the  formal  labor  market),  it  may  be  considered  an
application of Rawles'  principle for redistribution.  Gender ratios are narrowed  for those
below  the truncation point, who get raised to the MPG  level. Those above the truncation
point are unaffected.  As we shall see, this poverty prevention emphasis is different from
the concept of equity embodied in the Mexican and Argentinean plans. Given this narrow
targeting of Chile's MPG, its fiscal cost will be extremely  low in the baseline case.  The
18estimated  cost of a price-indexed  MPG  in  a moderate  growth  scenario  is  about  1%of
payroll.1 2 In virtually all scenarios  in Chile,  women are the major recipients-they  are
the least well off (Table 6).
The MPG as insurance  against  partial  labor  force attachment. Since the average
male worker in every  educational  category accumulates  an own-pension  far above  the
floor set by the price-indexed  MPG,  he  never needs  a top-up.  In contrast,  the  average
female with primary education or less gets a small (20% or $15) monthly top-up to own-
pension from the MPG,  helping to narrow the gender gap  for low earners.'3 Her pension
is consequently  39%  of her  male  counterpart's,  rather  than  32%  that  she would  get
without  the MPG,  and  she  also  improves  her  position  relative  to  females  with  more
education (Table 6). 14
Women who work full career  (like men) do not get the MPG in any educational
category, because their own pensions  exceed the MPG. Thus,  the MVPG is mainly directed
toward  low  eamers  who  eam  low  wage  rates  and b) work  less  than  full career.  It  is
insurance against transient labor force attachment, mainly by women. Since labor market
attachment  is volitional,  to a large extent, some would question this  as an equitable and
efficient  arrangement.  In the presence  of a minimum pension  guarantee,  moral hazard
regarding work decisions is obviously present (see below).  Chile counters these issues by
imposing a requirement  that women work at least 20 years to be eligible; this  limits the
number of eligible women and the size of the top-up needed.15
Years  required for  eligibility  and  strategic  behavior.  The  twenty-year
requirement  for  eligibility  turns  out  to  be  a  fortuitous  choice.  In  practically  every
educational category, the average woman has more than 20 years of  work.  If the bar had
been placed at  10 years,  as in Argentina  for the reduced  flat, many middle class married
women  who  chose  to  stay  at  home  might  have  qualified,  a  subsidy  that would  be
expensive and that many would consider ill-targeted.  If the bar were raised to 25 years,  as
in Mexico, the average woman with less than a secondary degree  would fail  the test for
eligibility.  In that case,  the very group that qualifies on own-pension  grounds would be
ruled  out  on  years  of  contributions  grounds  and  no  one  would  get  the  MPG-
demonstrating the extreme sensitivity of gender impact to this policy variable.
19Given  the  20  years  required  for  eligibility  in  Chile,  it  is  likely  that over  time
contributory  years for low earners will adjust and converge around that point, as a result
of strategic behavior. Women with slightly less than 20 years will increase their working
time to qualify for the MPG.  In contrast,  women with a bit more than 20 years may cut
their working time down, because  their marginal public pension  for the additional years
of contributions  is negative;  their own larger private accumulation  simply displaces the
MPG  supplement.  Thus  we can  expect  a  clustering  of pensions  for  women  with  low
educational  levels around the neighborhood of the MPG in the future-a kind of poverty-
level  trap.  Although in general  Chile's  scheme  rewards  formal  sector  work through  its
private  pillar (DC plan) and through  the treatment of the widow's  pension (see below),
the MPG  encourages  strategic behavior and discourages work  for low earning women.16
This  potential  for  strategic  behavior  and  work  disincentive  could  be  avoided  if the
guaranteed pension increased  continuously with years of work above  a floor, rather than
simply being a target level with an on-off switch for eligibility.
The MPG as a deterrent to postponed retirement.  Closely  related,  the  current
retirement  age  for  women  is  only  60,  as  compared  with  65  for men,  in  Chile.  One
possible  policy change  that is under  discussion is to raise  the female retirement  age to
parity with that of men (to age  65). This policy change  would push ahead by 5 years the
date when women can begin drawing on their retirement  savings, it would increase by 5
the  years during  which  investment earnings  accrue,  and it would  reduce by 5 the years
during  which  they  collect  annuities.  The  combination  of these  forces  would  increase
women's  own-annuity  by  almost  50%--from  $76  to  $112  monthly  in  the  lowest
educational  category-even  if women  don't  do  any additional  work during  that 5-year
period. This brings the average woman in all educational categories  above the MPG level
so  she  loses  the  MPG  for her  entire  period  of retirement.  Because  of this  crowd-out
effect, the MPG poses a strong disincentive to these women to postpone their retirement
beyond  age  60-for  every  dollar  of monthly  pension  income  they  earn,  they  get  a
commensurate  cut in their MPG.'7
Wage versus price-indexation of MPG: do future cohorts of women benefit?  The
low projected cost of the MPG is due in large part to the fact that it is expected  to remain
constant  in real  value  and to  decline  through time  as  a percentage  of wages  and own-
20pensions.  Given  our  projected  real  wage  growth  of 2%  per year,  in  40  years,  when
today's  young workers  retire,  the  $91  MPG  would be only  10%  of the  average  wage
instead  of 25%,  as  it is now, under  these assumptions.  Ten years later the need  for the
MPG  top-up  would  virtually  disappear  as  wages  and  accumulations  continue  to  grow
relative to a constant MPG.  If it were formally price indexed this would protect retirees
from  inflation  but  the  protected  floor would  fall  relative  to  average  wage  for  future
cohorts,  and it would eventually become  irrelevant.  Thus, a price-indexed  MPG will do
little  to improve  gender ratios  in the  future.  A wage-indexed  MPG, in contrast,  would
maintain  the  current  ratio  between  the  protected  floor  and  the  average  wage-but  it
would cost much more and poses much greater moral hazard problems.  (The safety net in
Mexico and Argentina also will diminish over time compared with the average wage and
hence will give less relative protection to future cohorts of older women.)
Chile is apparently  ambivalent on this issue, so we have modeled both price and
wage  indexation.  So  far,  the MPG  has  kept pace  with wage  growth  through  ad hoc
increases. By the end of 2001  it had reached $110 for pensioners below age 70 and $121
for pensioners  above age 70. If ad hoc wage indexation continues, it would reach $200 by
the time today's young workers  retire.  The top-up  for women in the lowest educational
category  would  rise  from  $15  to  $124  monthly  and  the  gender  ratio  in  that  category
would rise  from 39%  to 85%.  A much broader group  of women (and even  some men)
would receive  some  top-up.  Differentials  between high and low earning women would
be compressed  (Table 6A). Of course, this increase in transfers would increase the fiscal
cost substantially.  It would also lead to much greater strategic manipulation and incentive
to work in the informal sector once eligibility is established-for men as well as women.
This could be countered  by tying the MPG level  continuously to work experience,  as in
Mexico.18
Insurance against prolonged slow growth.  These  results  are  very  sensitive  to
assumptions  about  investment returns  and wage growth.  In a slow-growth environment
(real  rate of return  = 3%,  real wage growth = 0), the $91  price-indexed  MPCG  is much
higher relative to workers'  own annuity.  Accumulations  simply do not build up very far
under low wage growth and investment returns. The MPG makes up the difference, up to
$91,  so  total  expenditures  on  the  MPG  escalate  sharply.  Consequently,  under  slow
21growth we  find that some  men with  low educational  levels qualify for an MPG top-up,
and  most  women  qualify,  including  many  with  university  education  (Table  6B  and
Appendix  C).  The  gender  ratio  is narrowed  dramatically;  in  some  categories  it almost
disappears.  Of course, the government might encounter a financing problem, under these
circumstances.  But if the MPG can be debt  financed,  cohorts who  live  in such  periods
are,  in  effect,  cross-subsidized  by  cohorts  who  live  in  more  fortunate  periods,  which
smooths  the  pensions  of  cohorts  over  time.  And  the  majority  of the  recipients  are
women.19
Summary for Chile.  In  sum,  the  MPG  in  Chile  is  inexpensive,  well  targeted
toward low earners,  especially women,  and insures workers against prolonged periods of
slow growth. It reduces  the gender gap at the low educational  end but not at the middle or
high  end, nor does  it help women  who worked in the  formal  labor market  less than 20
years.  It  distorts  marginal  work  decisions beyond  20 years  and beyond  age  60 for  low
earming women, hence leaving them in a "near-poverty  trap."  As real wages increase  the
guarantee  will  decline  relative  to  the  average  wage  and  it  will  have  a  smaller  and
disappearing impact on gender differentials.  Its impact  will be maintained if it rises with
wage growth,  but then  its monetary  and moral  hazard  costs  also  rise.  Work effort  by
women might be  increased,  gender gap  decreased  and future  cohorts better protected  if
retirement  age  were  equalized  for the  two  genders  and the  MPG were partially  wage-
indexed but tied positively and continuously to work.
The two-tiered  flat benefit in Argentina
Eligibility for the basic benefit-not for women.  Argentina  pays a  flat benefit  of
US$200  as an add-on rather than a top-up to the worker's  own-pension.  (Recall that we
are  using  1997  exchange  rates  in converting  to  US  $'s.)  It was  initially  equivalent  to
30%  of the  average  male  wage,  45%  of the  average  female  wage  and  130%  of the
poverty line. It is not formally indexed and has remained constant over time. Thirty years
of contributions are required for eligibility.  Most men in all educational  categories  meet
this requirement  and receive this benefit,  starting at age 65. Among men, the flat benefit
increases  their  total  pension  by percentages  ranging  from  25-40%  for  those  without
secondary  education,  to  10-20%  for those  with university  education.  Because  it adds  a
substantial  uniform  amount  to  a  disparate  wage-based  annuity,  it  is  very  effective  at
22equalizing  pensions between  high  and  low  earning  men.  In  contrast,  most women  are
ineligible for this flat benefit because they work less than 30 years--except  for those with
university education, who can begin receiving the full flat at age 60. This is the converse
of the eligibility situation in Chile (Table 6 and Figure 2).
Reduced basic benefit for women.  Most women are eligible  for the reduced basic
benefit of $140  at age  70, which  accrues  to workers  who have more  than 10 years  of
contributions.  Compared  with  the  woman's  own  wage  and  annuity,  this  reduced  flat
benefit is very large. It doubles the monthly pension of the average woman with less than
secondary  education  and trebles the  monthly pension of the ten year woman,  at age 70.
This leads to a sharply contrasting situation between women at ages 65 and 70: at age 65
the female/male  ratio of monthly pensions is lower than in Chile or Mexico. But it jumps
up to the same range as Chile and Mexico-30-45%--at  age 70.20  The flat benefit is the
same in absolute value during periods  of slow growth,  but much larger relative  to own-
annuity,  thereby  providing  insurance  that  pays  off to  both  genders,  but  especially  to
women,  living  during  prolonged  economic  slowdown.  Both  the  flat  and reduced  flat
benefits  will diminish  in relative  importance  over time  as wages  rise, but will  remain
significant  factors for many years,  given the high starting point.
Discontinuous link to years worked.  Argentina's  attempt to extend  a minimum
benefit to  all,  while  also rewarding  work  to some  extent,  leads  to  puzzling  pattem of
work  (dis)incentives.  Women  face  a  large  reward  for  working  10  years  in the  formal
labor market, but no marginal benefit from contributing to the public pillar over years 10-
29:  a person who has worked for 10 years gets the same reduced  flat benefit and a much
larger subsidy  than one  who has contributed  for 29 years.  Then,  in year 30,  the public
benefit  jumps  discontinuously  to  full  flat  beginning  at  age  60.  the  equity  of this
arrangement  is  questionable,  nor  does  it  seem  consistent  with  positive  incentives  to
participate  in the formal  sector over the range where most women are now (18-25 years
of work).  Since  the public benefit is a large part of the  total system  in Argentina, these
equity,  efficiency  and  evasion  problems  stemming  from  eligibility  conditions  and
discontinuities  also  loom  large.  Argentinean  policy-makers  apparently  reached  this
conclusion and recommended  linking the flat benefit more continuously to years of work
in the year 2000 reforms (not yet implemented).
23Mexico:  MPG versus social  quota.
The social quota (SQ). The main tool of the public pillar in Mexico  is the social
quota  (SQ)--a  uniform  payment  by  the  government  into  each  worker's  individual
account,  per day worked.  This daily payment  is independent of his or her own wage rate
and  of how  many  years  the  worker  has  contributed,  in  toto.  The  SQ  is  5.5%  of the
minimum wage (initially 1.8% of the average male wage and 2.6% of the average female
wage) for every day worked.  Thus it is roughly a one-third match to the 6.5%  contributed
toward the private  pillar.  It is more expensive  than Chile's MPG but far less  expensive
than Argentina's flat.  It should produce an annuity that is about  10%  of the average wage
for the full career worker. Mexico's  SQ gives the most equal treatment per day of work to
all educational  and gender groups.  In this sense it is the least tilted toward women but the
most  effective  at  incentivizing  work and  contributions  (Table 6).  Although  it equalizes
less than Chile at the lowest level, it equalizes more at other levels. Since it is indexed to
prices, it will decline over time relative to the average wage
Public  benefits  are  sometimes  criticized  on  grounds  that  they  incur  a  large
unfunded  liability that  future  generations  will  have  to  meet.  If funded,  the government
may misuse the money in the meantime. The Mexican SQ deals with these issues by pre-
funding  the  benefit  and  putting  the  money  into  each  worker's  account  to  invest.  Flat
benefits  (as in Argentina) or MPG's with an on-off switch (as in Chile)  are criticized on
grounds  that  they  contain  work  disincentives  and  create  inequitable  cliff effects.  The
Mexican SQ avoids this problem by making the payments  a continuous  function of days
worked.  This means  it redistributes  primarily  to people  who are  poor because of their
low wage rates,  rather than people who are poor because  they only worked part of their
lives.
Irrelevance of the MPG. For poverty-prevention  Mexico  also has  an MPG, but it
is far less relevant than that in Chile.  In our baseline case,  largely because of their equal
retirement  ages,  both  the  average  man  and  woman  in  all  educational  categories
accumulate  an own-pension that exceeds  the MPG floor.  In contrast,  under slow growth
men continue to exceed the MPG while the average woman is below the MPG line all the
way up to the university  level.  But none of these average  women  have enough years  of
contributions  for  eligibility.2'  Thus  neither  the  average  man  nor  woman  receive
24Mexico's MPG, but for diametrically opposite reasons. The choice between a 20 and 25-
year eligibility rule tums out to be crucial, given current labor force behavior of women.
Conmparing tIe lfedme  trnm  bDe  blicn5firs  er$  ios  a-gnrounps
The public pillars  in all three countries  compress monthly pension differentials
and improve the gender  ratio.  They all increase disproportionately  the monthly pensions
of workers  in  the  low  educational  categories,  especially  the  lowest  eamers  in  these
categories,  who  are  predominantly  women.  They  all  reduce  old  age  poverty  among
women.  However, the different  forms that these public pillars take have  quite different
distributional  effects  on sub-groups  among  women.  These  variations  reflect  different
concepts of equity and different trade-offs between equality and work incentives.
To  analyze  these  effects,  we  shift  to  a  lifetime  rather  than  a monthly  unit of
comparison. This is necessary because the retirement  age varies across countries and sub-
groups. In Chile women retire at age 60 while men retire at 65. In Argentina high earning
women  are  eligible  for the full  flat  at  age  60 while  men  get  it  at  65  and  low eaming
women,  who typically work fewer years,  are eligible  for the reduced flat at 70. In Mexico
both men and women retire at 65. In each case,  we calculate the expected present value
(EPV) of the lifetime  stream of income  from  the public  and private pillars,  as valued  at
age  65.22  In  all  three  countries,  lifetime  pension  gender  differentials  are  smaller  than
monthly differentials  because women live longer than men and (in Chile and Argentina)
retire  earlier.  In  Chile  only  low  wage  women  with  transient  labor  force  attachment
receive  a benefit  from  the public  pillar  (the  rest only  receive  money from  the private
pillar),  while in Argentina  and Mexico  all workers receive  some public benefit,  and  the
gross benefit is larger for men than for women.
To determine net benefits we must take  account of taxes that are used to finance
these benefits.  Recall  that these public  benefits are  financed  out of general revenues  in
Chile  and  Mexico,  and  out  of a  combination  of payroll  and  other  special  taxes  in
Argentina.  We  don't know  the level of these lifetime  taxes for each cohort,  but in the
following  discussion we  assume they are distributed within each  cohort proportional  to
lifetime wages and we use lifetime own-annuity  as a proxy that is highly correlated with
lifetime  wage.  Since  the  public  benefit  in  these  three  countries  adds  a  much  larger
percentage  increment  to  lifetime  own-annuity  for  low  earners  and  women,  these  two
25groups  receive  a net  transfer  and  the  subsidy  component  is  largest  for women  in  the
lowest educational categories  (Table 7).
However,  formal labor force  attachment is rewarded  differentially in these three
countries.  Specifically,  only the  average  woman  in the  lowest  educational  group,  who
retires early with about 20 years experience,  gets  a positive net transfer in Chile. Neither
ten-year women nor full career women nor average  women who postpone retirement get
the MPG.  In contrast, in Mexico, which offers the most consistent rewards for work, full
career  women in the bottom  educational  groups get the largest total net transfers.23 And
in  Argentina  ten-year  women  get  the  highest  rate  of return.  The  formal  sector  work
disincentives  from the  public  pillar in  Argentina and  Chile partially  offset the  positive
work  incentives  stemming  from the DC pillar and the joint  annuity,  especially  for low
earners.
VI. Gender Impact of Annuity Requirements-intra-household  transfers
By far the largest  impact on lifetime  gender differentials  stems, not from public
transfers, but from private  intra-household  transfers  through  the joint annuity.  From the
viewpoint of gender equality,  this is the biggest innovation  in the new  systems. Women
live  longer  than  men  and are typically  younger  than their  spouses.  Thus  annuitization,
including  price-indexation  of benefits,  is very important  to women,  who  may otherwise
run out of money before  they die.  Thus also, widows  are more common than widowers,
so survivors'  benefits are particularly  important to women when the husband is working
and joint annuities are vital after retirement. For these reasons,  all three countries include
rules regarding  annuitization and survivors'  benefits, which generate  large transfers  from
husbands to wives.  In periods of moderately high growth, these transfers are much larger
than  those  through  the  public  pillar,  especially  for  middle  and  high-income  groups
(Figure  3).  They are  the  main  mechanisms  by which  the  new  social  security  systems
protect older women.  Single women and those cohabitating without a formal marriage  do
not benefit from this transfer.
Survivors' benefits while husband is working
26In traditional DB systems survivors' benefits are paid out of the common pool and are
a fixed  percentage  of the  husband's  potential  benefit.  This  means that  husbands  with
young wives or with high pension returns are subsidized by others, including single  and
low-income  households.  In  contrast,  in the  new  Latin  American  multi-pillar  systems,
husbands  are required  to purchase  survivors'  insurance for their wives,  which  ends this
inter-household  subsidy.  They pay a small amount (far less than  1% of payroll), for this
insurance.  Cost  and  benefits  of  survivors'  insurance  are  internalized  within  each
household.  In  this  paper  we  do  not  include  the  value  of survivors'  benefits,  as  our
representative  men  and women are  all assumed to live an "average"  lifetime.  To  this
extent we understate the transfer from men to women in the new systems.
lJomt amintities  after reThrement
Additionally, all three countries require that, when husbands retire and annuitize, they
purchase  joint  annuities  (or  take  gradual  withdrawals  spread  over  both  lives),  fiurther
protecting  their  wives.  In  Chile  and  Mexico  the  survivor  gets  at  least  60%  and  in
Argentina 70% of the primary benefit. The requirements of survivors'  insurance and joint
annuities  can be viewed  as a formalization of the informal family contract, in which men
agree  to provide monetary support to their wives  in return for non-monetary household
services; the joint annuity is a way to fulfill this obligation after the husband's death.24 In
our main simulations given  above we therefore  assumed joint annuities for married men
(but  not for  women).  The cost  of the joint annuity  (in terms of lower  payout  to the
husband)  depends  on the  age  of the  wife.  When  we  assume  that  the wife  is  3 years
younger  than the husband,  joint  annuities  pay  12-17%  less  per  month than individual
annuities  (Table  8).  The average  annual  widow's  benefit  after the  husband's  death is
usually greater than her own-pension.
Joint  annuities  are especially important  because the cost of living of a couple is
not very different from the cost of living of a single widow, due to household economies
of scale. Without  such annuities,  a woman's standard of living would drop precipitously
after her husbands' death-even if she had a pension of her own. The widow's plus own-
benefit maintains  household purchasing  power  at 70-80%  of the previous  level,  so  her
standard of living is roughly unchanged.  The joint annuity also protects women who did
not work at all in the formal market, maintaining household purchasing power at 60-70%
27of previous  levels.  This  could, of course,  be achieved  without a joint  annuity if each
household  were  far-sighted,  rational  and  took  the  welfare  of both  members  fully  into
account.  However,  if households  are  myopic,  or if the husband places  greater weight  on
consumption  during the period  when  he will be alive, the household may not  save  and
insure  enough voluntarily  and may, in fact, use up its pre-retirement  savings as well (for
empirical  evidence  see  Bermheim  et  al  2003).  A  similar  objective  could  be  achieved
through earning-sharing  or if husbands were required to fund separate  accounts  for non-
working  wives;  however,  this might  be  difficult to enforce.  The joint annuity is easily
monitored  and it ensures  that something is left over for the surviving wife.  It postpones
consumption  and places greater income under the direct control of the woman, when she
becomes a widow. It is likely to reduce the incidence of poverty among very old women.
It  accomplishes  this without  putting  a  burden  on  single  men  and women  through  the
common pool, as the old systems did.  The clear equity principle in societies that impose
this requirement  is that  it  is  a  family responsibility  to  support  very  old  women,  where
they can afford to do so.
The  requirement  of joint  annuities  or  withdrawals  scheduled  over  the  joint
lifetime  of husbands  and  wives  means  that  lifetime  transfers  and rates  of return  vary
strongly  by gender  and  marital  status  (Table  7).  Married  men  lose  relative  to  singles
because  they  must  purchase  a joint  annuity.  Of course,  this  income  foregone  by  the
husband  is eventually  received  by his  wife.  So  from  the  vantage  point  of the married
household,  in the long run this positive and negative transfer cancels  out. However,  from
the vantage point of each individual  member, the joint annuity requirement shifts income
to  the  woman,  later  in  life,  just  at  the  point  when  she  most  needs  it most,  to avoid  a
drastic  drop  in  household  income.  The  lifetime  transfer  through  the joint  annuity  far
exceeds  the transfer  from the  public pillar,  in practically  every educational  group  in all
three countries.  It adds about 30-70% to the lifetime benefit of the average  woman in all
educational  categories.  For ten-year women,  the joint annuity  almost doubles the  wife's
own-annuity in Chile and more than doubles it in Argentina  and Mexico--this  is the main
means of support of very old women who have worked mainly in the home.  It raises the
average female/male  ratio of total lifetime benefits to 60-90%, and for full career women,
to  over  100%.  In  contrast,  full  career  single  or divorced  women or  those  cohabiting
28without a formal marriage are estimated  to have  lifetime benefits 70-80% those of single
men (Tables 7 and 10). Unless joint annuities are extended to these groups, either through
legal or voluntary arrangements,  they will  have relatively  low pensions in old  age  as  a
corollary to their relatively low wages while working.25
The infteirctiioim  lbetweeDn Doiim  u  gflities and  uiriseu tiabRs?
One reason for the lower annual annuities of women is their greater longevity. To
eliminate  this impact,  some countries  specify that unisex  mortality tables must be used
for pricing annuities that are part of their mandatory systems. None of our three countries
require this, but it is likely to be required in Europe and the US and is under consideration
in Latin America. Unisex tables apply the average mortality rates of men plus women to
both  genders,  in  contrast  to  gender-specific  tables  that  apply  different  (higher)  life
expectancies  to women.  They  reduce men's payouts  and increase  women's by 5-10%,
when  individual  annuities  are  involved  (Table  8).  The public pillar  implicitly  uses  a
unisex concept, as annual benefits are not tied explicitly to gender.
Gender  is  one of the main dimensions  of risk categorization  used by insurance
companies,  unless regulations  require  unisex risk rating.  Requiring  unisex tables is very
controversial,  since it implies discarding information relevant  to risk categorization  and
redistributing  from  men  (both  high  and  low  earners)  to  women  (both  high  and  low
earners).  In  a  competitive  insurance  market,  the  unisex  requirement  may  lead  to
creaming,  selection and market instability problems, as (1)  each company tries to attract
the better  risks (men),  (2)  companies  that end up with a disproportionate  number of the
bad  risks  (women)  will  make  losses,  and  (3)  men  are  discouraged  from  purchasing
annuities  because  their  expected  lifetime payments  are  less than the premiums  they are
charged.
The  decision  about whether  or not to require  unisex  mortality tables  in view of
these  potential  problems  depends  in  part  on  a  value  judgment  about  whether  to
redistribute from one gender to another and in part on whether other more efficient ways
have  been  adopted  to  achieve  social  goals  such  as  poverty  prevention  among  older
women.  If unisex  tables  are  required they should  probably be accompanied  by  a risk-
adjustnent mechanism-imposing  a tax per man and using it to  finance  a subsidy per
woman,  in order to make both genders  equally profitable to the insurance  company and
29alleviate  the  supply  side  problems  mentioned  above  (points  #1  and  2).  However,  the
demand  side  selection  problem will  still  remain  if annuitization  is  voluntary,  and  may
lead  the market  for individual  annuities to be dominated  by women.  In that case, unisex
tables that  are based on average annuitant  mortality will  effectively use gender-specific
female rates, and men will be worse off without making women better off.
Fortunately,  when joint  annuities  are  involved  unisex  tables  matter much  less,
since the payout extends over both lifetimes in either case.  For married men and women,
monthly  and  lifetime  payouts  and  gender  ratios  of pensions  stemming  from  joint
annuities are  very similar whether unisex or gender-specific tables  are used (Table 8). To
the  degree  that married  couples  predominate,  requiring  joint  annuities  may be  a  less
divisive  alternative  to  unisex  tables  or  a  way  to avoid  selection  and  market  instability
problems  in the context of a unisex  requirement.  (Annuities market  issues are discussed
further in James et al  1999a and b and 2001a and b).
VI.  Gender Impact of the Shift From the Old to the New Systems
New  methodological  problems
Comparison  of  the  new  and  old  social  security  systems  in  Latin  America  is
difficult  because  the  old  systems  were  insolvent  and  unable  to  provide  the  promised
benefits.  This was true in the long run of all three countries,  it was true even  in the short
run in  Chile,  and Argentina  was already defaulting  on payments.  Since  we don't know
what the counterfactual  would have been (higher taxes?  lower benefits?),  it is impossible
to determine absolute gains or losses from the change. To avoid this problem we focus on
the relative positions  of men and  women  in different  educational-marital  groups  in  the
new and  old  systems.  We  ask:  (1)  Who  gained  or lost the most  from  the  reform,  in  a
relative sense?  (2) Did the gender ratio get larger or smaller in the process of the reform?
As noted earlier, these questions are consistent with any counterfactual  in which the fiscal
adjustment would have involved equi-proportional  benefit  cuts or tax increases  for each
group,  so  relative  positions  would  have  been  unchanged  (see  previous  discussion  of
counterfactual).
30In  addressing  question  #1,  we compare  the ratios  of post-reform to pre-reform
expected lifetime benefits for each sub-group, normalizing  according to the ratio for the
married man in the top educational  group. That is, we examine how much each sub-group
gained or lost relative  to the change experienced by the high-income married man (Table
9).  This  enables  us  to focus  on  relative  rather  than  absolute  gains  or  losses, which  is
necessary given our counterfactual.  In addressing #2, we compare the old and new gender
ratios  to see if these ratios  improved  or deteriorated  due to the  reform  (Table  10).  We
focus on lifetime benefits because retirement age changed as part of the reform,  it differs
across countries  and sub-groups within each country,  and the widow's benefit starts at a
much later age than own-benefits. We carry out this calculation for workers who entered
the labor market after the reform, thereby avoiding all transition arrangements.
Desc2pflou  ofi  old systems
In general, the old systems provided a benefit of the following sort:
B = aYS, where:
B = monthly pension benefits,
Y = number of contributory years,
S = average salary during last few years of work,
a = incremental benefit per year of work.
Often,  a was quite  high for the first ten  years or  so, and much lower thereafter.
Sometimes  it provided  a  minimum  benefit  for ten  years  of contributions.26 Thus,  this
formula often provided a generous benefit for women who worked for only a short time
and  then  withdrew  from  the  labor  market.  In  our three  sample  countries,  the  first ten
years of contributions produced  a very high replacement rate, but additional years  added
relatively  little.  Women were  more  likely than  men  to work  for  10-20  years  and then
leave the formal labor market.  Married women who  spent little  time in the formal labor
market got a widow's benefit that was 50% of their husband's pension in Chile, 75%  in
Argentina and 90% in Mexico.  Inplicitly, unisex  tables were used. Women  could retire
five years earlier than men with no actuarial penalty in Chile and Argentina.
In  contrast  to  these  provisions  that  favored  women,  the old  systems  based
their benefits on the last few working years,  which favored full career  workers who are
predominantly  men. A woman who worked  at ages  20-30,  before child-bearing,  would
earn no  interest  on her  contributions  and would  fimd her pension  based  on wages  that
31would appear to be very low compared with prevailing wages when she retired  at age 60-
65  (e.g.  in our baseline  scenario of 2%  real wage growth per year the average wage  rate
would  have  doubled  over  that  period).  In  addition,  using  final  years'  salary  as  the
reference  wage  especially favored  workers with steep age-earnings  profiles, who tended
to  be  highly  educated  men.  Furthermore,  in Chile  women  had  to  give  up  their  own
pension  to get  the widow's pension,  so women who  worked  much of their lives in the
labor  market  got  little  or  no  incremental  benefit  from  their  own  contributions.
Contributions  represented  a pure tax for most working women, thereby discouraging their
participation  in the labor force.  This was also the law  in Argentina (law  18-037,  article
68 #33)  although  it was very unevenly enforce  there.  In the new systems, women keep
their  own  benefit  as  well  as  the  joint  annuity.  Contributions  that  are  made  in  early
adulthood  add  more  to  present  value  ,of  lifetime  benefits  at  retirement  age  than
contributions  made in the final years.  Further, as we have  seen, the new public pillars are
tilted  toward  low  earners,  who  are  predominantly  women.  These  provisions  play  an
important role in comparisons  of new and old systems.
Inflation
Finally, the failure of the old systems to index for inflation was a major disadvantage
to all workers, but especially  to women.  In these simulations we do did not take inflation
into  account,  although  inflation  played  a large  role  in discrediting  the  old  systems  of
these  countries.  Pensionable  salaries  were  based on past  wages that were  usually not
indexed  up for inflation.  Once  a person  retired,  benefits  were  usually not indexed  for
inflation.  Yet,  these  countries  had  very  high  levels  of inflation  that  often  made  their
pensions worthless.  Ad hoc adjustments were made, but these always lagged the pace of
inflation. In fact, such lags were the major way that governments  created the appearance
of solvency in the old systems that were actually insolvent.  The impact of inflation was
very idiosyncratic,  depending  exactly on how  adjustments  were made. Usually  inflation
posed  a particular  problem  for women,  who  may have  done  their market  work  many
years  in the past  (prior to marriage  and  children)  and who, after retirement,  lived many
years  into the  future. But if a minimum  pension existed  and was adjusted more readily
than higher pensions, this would have  given an advantage to women.
32In  contrast,  in  the  new  systems:  (1)  Financial  instruments  (stocks,  bonds  and
mortgages)  held by the private pillar generally  earn a positive real rate of return (that is,
above the rate of inflation) in the long run. (2) International diversification of investments
is permitted,  which further protects pension funds  from country-specific  inflation; (3) In
Chile  private  annuities  acquired upon  retirement  are  indexed,  as are  all medium-  and
long-term  financial  transactions-a  response  to  a history  of high  inflation.  In  Mexico
public pillar benefits are price-indexed and regulations call  for annuities  to be indexed--
but-'it  is  not  clear  whether  private  insurance  companies  will  be  able  to provide  this
product  and if they do,  whether  it will be  credible  and  cost-effective  (see James  et  al
2001a, 2001b).
We abstract from inflation because both the rate of price increase and the type and
speed of pension adjustment were not consistent across countries and even within a given
country they  varied  considerably  over time-but these  effects  were  always  strong and
negative. If we had taken inflation into account, the real value of expected benefits in the
old systems  would have  been  far  lower,  the increment  in value  from the  new system
would  show up as much higher,  and often  these effects  were particularly beneficial  for
women.
CemJpaErISof  of lffetme beimelto unmder mew  Md  lOd  $y$uem$
Using the old system formulae to generate the expected present value (at age 65)
of lifetime pensions,  we start with our first  question--who  gained or lost the most from
the change in systems?  To address this question we calculate  the ratio of post and pre-
reform lifetime benefits and normalize according to the ratio for male workers in the top
educational  group.  Based on the discussion to this point,  we would expect the following
groups to be the biggest gainers:
i)  low  earners  (as  proxied  by  low  educational  category)  of both  genders  but
especially  women,  who  are  the  lowest  earners  in  each  category--  due  to  the
targeted public pillar;
2)  single  men--because  they no  longer have  to  subsidize  the widow's  benefit that
was financed from the common pool in the old systems;
333)  married women who work in the labor market-because  they can now keep their
own  annuity plus  the joint annuity whereas  previously,  in Chile  and Argentina,
they had to give up one or the other.
In  fact, that  is  exactly what  we  find.  In all three  countries,  workers  in the  two
lowest  educational  groups  gain more than  those in the  two highest groups  and  married
women generally gain more than married men (Table 9 and Figure 4).  In Chile married
full career women gain the most, because they had lost the most when they had to choose
between the widow's  benefit  and their own benefit  in  the  old system.  In Mexico  both
single and  married  full career women  gain  the most,  due to  the work-related  SQ.  Over
time this may induce  women in  general  to increase  their labor  force participation  rates
and  thereby  to  end  up  with  higher  pensions,  a process  that  is  already  underway  for
exogenous  reasons.  But in Argentina the largest  relative  gains  are registered  by average
and ten year women,  due to its relatively large flat benefit. Thus, moving on to the second
question, the comparison of female/male ratios of lifetime benefits under the old and new
systems,  we  find  that  1) gender  ratios  fall  when  only  the  own-annuity  is  taken  into
account;  2)  results  are  mixed when  the public  and  private  pillars  are both included;  3)
they ratios rise dramatically when benefits  from the joint annuity are added;  and 4) in all
three countries,  for almost all educational  categories  and levels of labor force attachment,
the relative position of women who get both the public benefit  and joint annuity rises in
the  new system compared  with the old,  and a major  reason  is the fact that they do not
have to give up their own pension to receive the widow's benefit (Table 10 and Figure 5).
Given  this  rationale,  how  do  single  women  fare?  This  is  important  since  an
increasing  proportion  of women  are  divorced  or  never  formally  married.  Informal
cohabitation  is not uncommon  among  low educated  groups in Latin  America  and, more
recently, among high educated  groups in the US and Europe.  While our data do not allow
us  to model  their wage  and  work histories  directly,  we  use  full  career  women without
joint annuity or widow's benefit as a proxy. (Recall, however, that if wages are a function
of experience  rather than age we may be understating  the  earnings  and  pensions of full
career  women).  In Argentina  and  Mexico  gender  ratios  improve  in the  new  system  for
single women  in the  bottom 3-4 educational  categories,  because  of the generous public
benefit that low earners receive.  In Chile,  where  full career  women don't get the MPG,
34their relative position  falls at the bottom end but rises at the top end. Concerns about the
relative  position of single women  could be addressed  through the  use of unisex  tables
(which redistributes  from men  to women),  through  partial  wage  indexation  of public
benefits  for the very old (which redistributes  to those  who live longer),  or through later
retirement  age--at least  equal to with that of men (which reallocates  one's own  old age
income from early to old old age).
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At the same time that the Latin American countries were reforming their systems,
the transition  economies  of Eastern  and  Central  Europe  and the  former  Soviet  Union
were facing huge financial  strains in their systems, which required them to reform also.
Thus  far, Kazakhstan,  Poland,  Hungary,  Latvia  and  Croatia have instituted  multi-pillar
reforms  and several others  are in the process of doing so. The data in these countries do
not  allow  the  same  sort of detailed  analysis  that  we have  described  above, but  some
preliminary effects are apparent and the contrast with Latin America is illuminating.
On the one hand, the magnitude of the gender gap in DC pensions is much smaller
in the transition economies, due to higher work propensities and more uniform wages for
women in this region.  On the other hand, women do not benefit from offsetting transfers
from  the  public  pillar or regulations  over  payouts  from the private  pillar to  the  same
extent  as in Latin America or in the old Communist  system.  In most cases  (Kazakhstan
being the  exception)  the  public  pillar is far larger  and  less  targeted than those  in Latin
America.  And unlike Latin America,  the joint annuity has not yet become  an equalizer of
lifetime pensions between the genders. As a result, in the transition economies, projected
monthly and lifetime pensions for women are less than those for men in the new systems,
while  they were very close previously.  Gender inequality appears  to be increasing as  a
result of the new systems interacting with new labor market behaviors.
While  the  details  of  the  pension  reforms  vary  across  the  different  transition
economies,  they have certain  features  in common:  1) a  closer linkage between benefits
and contributions through the adoption of a DC pillar;  2) a public pillar that is smaller
than  it  was  before  but  is  nevertheless  (except  for  Kazakhstan)  much  larger  and  less
35targeted toward low earners than that in most Latin American countries;  3) a higher-but
still quite low  and not equalized--retirement  age for women  and men;  4)  a reduction in
special  privileges  for  women  that previously  existed,  such  as  pension  credits  for time
spend on maternity  leave  or child care;  5) a weakening and in some cases elimination of
survivors'  benefits  and  a continuation  of the  old  system prohibition  on receiving  own-
pension and widow's pension simultaneously;  and 6) an absence of firm decisions,  so far,
on how the annuity stage of the private pillar will be handled.
Thus, the public pillar in most of these countries  is not meant to be an instrument of
redistribution to  women  and  low  earners,  as  in Latin  America.  Rather,  equity has been
defined  as  personal  responsibility  and  payment  in line  with work  and  contributions,  in
both pillars.  As for private intra-household  transfers,  it is expected  that unisex and joint
annuities will play a large role, but this has not yet been legislated in most of the region.
Moreover,  many  couples  live  together  without  legal  marriage,  and  divorce  is  more
common than in Latin America,  so the problem of single older women looms larger in the
transition  economies.  Finally,  unlike  Chile,  these  countries  lack  the  indexed  financial
instruments that would enable low cost indexed  annuities.
Given  the close  linkage between  benefits  and  contributions  both  in the public  and
private pillars, labor force participation  rates,  wage rates and retirement  age now matter.
Yet, just as they begin to matter, a growing gap has appeared in the work histories of men
and women.  This combination of forces means that projected pension  gender ratios have
fallen  to  50-60%  or  even  less.  Simulations  for Poland  (by  Chlon  in Woycicka  2001)
indicate that pensions received by women would be only 45%  as much as those of men if
gender-specific  mortality  tables  are  used  for  annuitization.  This  increases  to  57%  if
unisex mortality tables are used for annuitization,  and 73% if retirement  age is equalized
at 65  and women  work  4 out of the 5 extra  years.  The remaining  differential of 27%  is
due  mainly to  wage  disparities  between  men  and women.  These  gender  ratios may be
compared with much higher numbers  under the  old system:  81%  based on current  labor
market behavior and 95-100% with old behavior.
In Poland and several other transition economies, joint annuities  are not yet required,
although  they  are  under  consideration.  In  general,  it  is  not  clear  whether  indexed
annuities  and unisex tables will be mandated  and, if so, whether  the necessary ancillary
36steps  (such  as  issuing  indexed  government  bonds  and  setting  up  a  risk  adjustment
mechanism)  will be taken to make them feasible.  If survivors'  benefits are weakened,  if
joint  annuities  are  not required,  if women  must  choose  between  own benefit  and the
widow's  benefit  from the public  pillar,  and if fewer women  are married  anyway,  then
older women may face  a problem  in maintaining  their standard of living and very  old
women may find themselves living close to the poverty line.
VlHI. 0oEndm¢onof
Our empirical  investigations  show  that  (1)  women's  own-annuities  are  lower than
those of men in multi-pillar pension schemes,  but (2) women are recipients of net public
transfers  and  private  intra-household  transfers  that  raise  their  rate  of  return  on
contributions  above  that of men.  As a result of these forces  (3)  women  are  the major
recipients  of redistributions  and  have  gained  more  than  men  from  the  reforms-the
lifetime  gender  ratio  has  improved.  These  redistributions  and  imlproved  gender  ratios
stem  from  the  targeting  of  the  public  pillars  toward  low  earners  and,  even  more
important, from regulations  over payouts  from the private pillar. Women tend to be low
earners, hence beneficiaries  of targeting in the new public pillars. Women tend to outlive
men, so restrictions  on payouts systematically redistribute  from husbands to wives. Joint
annuity requirements play the largest role. These transfers, taken together, raise women's
lifetime pensions to a level that is 60-80% that of men and 100% or more for full career
married women.  Women get a higher rate of return than men in the new systems  and  a
higher relative  benefit  than  they  did  in the  old  systems.  The  gender  gap is narrowed
further  for  women  who  live  during  periods  of  slow  growth,  since  disparate  own-
accumulations  are smaller and the equalizing public pillar is relatively larger.
Some caveats: While women as a group gained in our three Latin American countries,
different groups of women benefited the most in each case and some gaps emerge. Single
women  and  those  cohabiting  without  a formal  marriage  contract  receive  much  lower
lifetime benefits than men or married women, because they have lower wages and greater
longevity than men and don't gain from the joint annuity,  as do married women.  Even if
they work full career,  their pensions will be relatively low so long as their wage rates and
37retirement  age remain relatively  low. The fact that women can keep their own-annuity in
addition to the joint annuity encourages  formal sector work for married women and may
induce  an increase in their labor force participation rates and pensions over the long run.
But  the  terms  of the  reduced  flat  benefit  in  Argentina  and  the  MPG  in  Chile  could
discourage  such  work by  low  earning  women  after  10  and  20  years of contributions,
respectively.  Moreover,  the  earlier  allowable  retirement  age  of women  in  Chile  and
Argentina  further reduces  their incentive to work and  may leave  them with a relatively
small income in very old age.
All workers, and especially women, benefit from the fact that the private pillar earns a
rate  of return  that  will  generally  exceed  the  rate  of inflation  and,  in  Chile,  can  be
converted into a price-indexed annuity upon retirement.  They also benefit from the price-
indexed public benefit in Mexico. However,  automatic price indexation is still missing in
Chile  and  Argentina,  which  could  hurt  very  old  women.  Moreover,  since  the public
benefit isn't wage-indexed  it will not  rise in real  value  through  time,  it will  gradually
diminish  in size  relative  to  workers'  wage  and  own-annuity,  and  its equalizing  impact
will disappear for future generations.  (Chile has increased the MPG with wages on an ad
hoc  basis, perhaps  facilitated  by the relatively  low  cost of its MPG,  and offers a  10%r
MPG increment for very old pensioners).
Finally,  this  paper  has  dealt  with  women  who  are  in  or  have  husbands  in  the
contributory social security system.  It does not deal with the large group of rural women
in low-income  countries who  do not meet  these  criteria and may have little  income or
savings when they become old. A non-contributory program  is needed to supplement the
family system and keep these women out of poverty.  This complex topic goes beyond the
purview of this paper.
The  favorable  outcome  that  we  have just  described  for  women  in  Latin  America
contrasts  with  outcomes  in the transition  economies  of Eastern  Europe  and the former
Soviet Union, where preliminary investigations  suggest that women lost from the reform,
due  to  the removal  of privileges  they  had  in the old  system,  the  absence  of a targeted
public  pillar in  the new system,  the weakening  of survivors benefits  and the failure  to
require joint annuities, as of yet (Castel  and Fox 2000; Woycicka 2001).  Thus, the gender
38impact of multi-pillar systems is not pre-ordained;  it depends on detailed design features
of these reforms.  Specifically:
a  Because  of labor  market  factors,  a  redistributive  public  pillar  is  particularly
important to older women.
o  Dangers  to be avoided  are eligibility rules that exclude women  or discourage
their formal sector work.
o  Indexation provisions determine whether old old women and future cohorts of
women will continue to benefit from the public pillar.
a  Because  of demographic  factors, joint annuities play a major role in maintaining
the living standards of older married women, who are likely to become widows.
o  This role  is particularly  constructive  if the joint annuities  are additive to  the
own-annuity and therefore  do not penalize formal work by women.
o  Careful attention needs to be given to joint payout rules in cases of divorce or
cohabitation without marriage.
o  Equalizing the retirement  age between  men and women substantially narrows the
gender gap in monthly pensions, without requiring public or private transfers.
o  It ensures  that lifetime retirement  savings are allocated to old old age instead
of young old age, and may encourage additional work and savings.
o  It is especially  important  for  single  women who  will  not receive  a boost to
their incomes from the joint annuity.
These  policy implications  are broadly  generalizeable  to all countries  that have  adopted
multi-pillar systems. 28
For  those  who  are  married,  a  key  social  choice  concerns  the  division  of
responsibility  between  the  family  and  society  at  large  for  the  welfare of older women
who have spent much of their lives providing household services.  Solutions such as joint
annuities,  earnings-sharing  and  viewing  retirement  savings  as community  property  in
case  of divorce  come  down  squarely  in  favor  of family  responsibility  that  is  legally
enforced.  In  contrast,  solutions  that  grant  generous  credits  for  the  first  10  years  of
contributions  and additional credits  for years of child-care or elder care,  financed by the
common pool,  are implicitly a statement  that much of the benefits  from these  activities
are external to the family directly involved, so the costs should also be borne externally.
39For single women who  do not benefit from the joint annuity,  solutions  are more
difficult  because  the  pension  differential  stemming  from  the  wage  differential  will
remain,  even if they work full career.  This applies to any earning-related  scheme, whether
public or private.  Both for single  and married women,  a complex  collective choice must
be  made about competing  social objectives  and  redistributive  goals.  Is the  main policy
objective to:  1) keep older women out of absolute poverty,  2)  keep them out of relative
poverty (compared  with the average  wage level  in society) or 3)  achieve  greater gender
equality  in  monthly  pensions,  even  above  the  poverty  line?  Which  design  pattern  is
"best"  depends  on  value judgments  that  are  inherent  in  these  differing  definitions  of
"equity"  and  the  willingness  to  trade-off  equity  for  work  incentives  and  lower  fiscal
costs.  In  our  sample  countries  women  as  a  group  have  gained  substantially  from the
targeted  public pillar and the formalization  of family responsibility in the new systems,
but  different  sub-groups  have  benefited  the  most in  each  case  and  controversial  issues
concerning  work  incentives  for women  and  protection  for  single,  very old  and  future
generations of women still remain.
40T1 able I-Maanm  featuinres of GiRd  amid New Systemms'
A.  Clbnle
GRd Systemn  New system
Structure  PAYG DB  Pillar II: funded individual accounts
(IA's)
Pillar I: minimum pension guarantee
(MPG)
Contribution rate  26%  13% to Pillar 1[;
I_PG financed from general revenues
Benefits  50% of base salary +  Pillar 1I: annuity from IA
1% for every year > 10  Pillar I: MPG
up to maximum of 70%
base salary  .
Base salary  Average of last 5 years  Not relevant
(final 3 years indexed)
Pensionable age  Men-65; women-60  Men-age 65; women-60
Years for eligibility  10 years  20 years for MPG; no minimum for IA
Pension if worked  0  Annuity from IA accumulation
fewer years  _
Indexation  provisions  No indexation  Price indexation of annuity in Pillar II
Ad hoc increases of MPG
Minimum pension  No minimum  MPG (about 27% of male average
_  wage) after 20 years
Widows  50% of husband's  60% of husband's pension (joint
pension or own pension  annuity) + own annuity
Notes:
1. Contribution  rates  given  for  individual  accounts  for  Chile  and  Argentina  include
approximately  3%  of payroll  for  survivors  and disability  insurance  plus  administrative
costs.  For  Mexico  the  contribution  rate  does  not  include  survivors  and  disability
insurance, which are handled separately.
41B. Argentina'  Old System  New System
PAYG DB  Pillar II: funded individual
Structure  accounts (IA's) or public DB
Pillar I: flat or reduced flat
benefit
Contribution rate  27% (lower before 1994)  11% to Pillar II
6-16% to Pillar I (varies by
region and time)
Benefits  JO: 70% of base salary +  Pillar II: Annuity from IA; or
1% for every year over 30;  public DB (.85%*years of
JEA: 50% of base + 1%  for  service*salary)
every year over 10  Pillar I: flat = about 30% of
male average wage+1%  extra
for yrs > 30; or reduced flat at
age 70 (21% of average wage)
Base salary  Average of 3 highest annual  For public Pillar II: average of
salaries within last  10 yrs  last 10 years wage; not
relevant for private Pillar II
Pensionable age  JO: Men-age 60; women-55  Men-age 65; women-60;
JEA: age 65  Reduced flat: age 70
Years for eligibility  JO: 20 years contributions  30 years for flat benefit
(15 before 1991);  10 years for reduced flat
JEA:  10 years service  no minimum for IA
Pension if worked fewer yrs  0  Annuity from IA accumulation
Indexation provisions  Ad hoc  Public benefit ad hoc (has been
constant);
Private annuity not indexed
Minimum pension  $150 after 10 years'  service  $140 after 10 years'  service
Widows  75% of husband's pension  70% of husband's pension
and/or  own pension  (joint annuity) + own annuity
Notes:
1.  Argentina had special provisions for the self-employed and many special regimes. We
focus  here  on  the  main  schemes  for  employees:  JO=  Jubilacion  Ordinaria;  JEA  =
Jubilacion  por  Edad  Avanzada.  The  JO  applied  to  those  with  20  years  of
contributions,  while  the  smaller  JEA  applied  to  those  with  10-20  years  of
contributions.  However,  the  old  scheme  changed  frequently  and  wasn't  always
implemented  as  written,  especially  in the absence  of records.  Widow's  benefit  was
treated unevenly.  The new system  also  has an ordinary flat benefit for 30+  years of
service  and a  reduced  flat for  10-30  years of service.  However,  the  government  is
considering tightening conditions for the reduced flat.
42C. Meidco
(ild  systemi  New Systemi
Structure  PAYG DB  Pillar II: Funded individual
accounts (IA's)
Pillar I: Social quota (SQ) +
minimum pension guarantee
MPG)
Contribution rate  8.5% (incl. .425%  from  6.5%  (incl. .225%  from govt.)
govt.)  + 2% (SAR,  1992)  + 5.5%  of minimum wage
from govt (SQ) + 5%  to
INlFONAVIT; SQ + MPG
financed from general
revenues'
Benefits  DB: 80-100% of base salary  Pillar II: annuity from IA +
(formula on separate page)  llIFONAVIT
Pillar I: annuity from SQ +
MPG
Base salary  Average of last 250  Not relevant
working weeks
Pensionable  age  65  65
Years for eligibility  10 years  25 years for MPG; no
minimum requirement for IA
Pension if worked fewer yrs  0  Annuity from IA accumulation
Indexation provisions  none  Annuity, SQ and MPG are
price-indexed
2
Minimumn pension  1 minimum wage after 10  1 minimum wage after 25
years'  contributions 2 years'  contributions2
Widows  90 % of husband's pension  60% of husband's pension
+ own pension  (joint annuity) + own annuity
Notes-
1.  The  social  quota  started  at  2.2%  of the  average  wage.  In  the  future,  if the
minimum wage goes up with price inflation  while the average wage rises faster because
of real wage growth, this percentage will fall. INFONAVIT is a housing fund from which
workers  can  borrow  to  help  finance  the  purchase  of a home.  This  existed  before  the
pension reform. As part of the reform, any balance in the worker's INFONAVIT  account
at  time  of retirement  is incorporated  into  the person's retirement  account.  The rate  of
return  on  INFONAVIT  has  been  very  low-less  than  the  rate  of  inflation.  Thus,
INFONAVIT  will  add  something  to the worker's  pension,  but  much  less  than  a 5%
contribution to the retirement account would.
2.  Under  the  old  system  the  minimum  pension  =  minimum  wage.  Linkage  of
minimum  wage  to  average  wage  was  ad  hoc.  Under  new  system,  SQ  and  MPG  are
formally  linked to CPI.  Mexico  also  plans for private  annuity  to be price-indexed  but
feasibility and cost remain to be determined.
43TABLE 2: Basic Demographic  and Economic  Data
Summary Data  Arge ntina  Chile  Mexico
men  women  men  women  men  women
1. Among working  age
population (16-65):
% currently employed  70.8%  40.0%  75.2%  38.0%  83.7%  44.1%
% ever employed  n.a.  n.a.  89.8%  70.5%  92.6%  78.5%
% affiliated to SSS  75.5%  66.6%  41.6%  31.6%  14.6%
2. Among older popul.  (60+):
% who receive own pension  49.7%  48.3%  67.6%  35.4%  30.5%  5.4%
% who receive other pensions  4.4%  25.6%  .03%  9.4%
% who live in extended families  22.3%  36.6%  42.8%  52.5%  35.9%  44.6%
% who get monetary transfers  7.7%  6.2%  NA  NA  15.0%  17.5%
from extended family
3. Life expectancy:
At age 60 (gender specific)  17.8  22.5  19.1  22.8  19.2  22.3
At age 65 (gender specific)  14.5  18.4  15.5  18.9  15.8  18.5
Unisex at retirement age  16.5  20.2  17.2  21.0  17.0  17.0
4. Wages  and pensions:
Average monthly wage (US$s)  $661  $445  $335  $245  $299  $214
Minimum W. (as % of average)  30.3%  44.9%  37.6%  51.4%  33.1%  46.3%
MPG or flat (as % of av. wage)  30.3%  44.9%  27%  37.2%  33.1%  46.3%
Social Assistance Pension  NA  NA  12.8%  17.6%  NA  NA
Poverty line (as % of av. Wage)  23.6%  35.1%  21.8%  29.9%  NA  NA
Data sources  and notes:
For  section  1, numbers  are  for  urban  population  in  household  surveys  described  in
Appendix  B.  Data  are  from  1994  (Chile),  1996-97  (Argentina),  and  1997  (Mexico).
Affiliation  to  the  social  security  system  in  Argentina  is  from  SAFJP:  "Proyecto
Indicadores  de Control Previsional Etapa 2 - Informe Final." (1999).
For section 2, Chile and Argentina, numbers  are from surveys  described in Appendix B.
For Argentina  breakdown between  own and other pensions is not available.  For Mexico,
data refer to country  as a whole,  from Parker and Wong (2001), using household survey
data.  Own  pensions  refer  to  old  age,  disability  and  severance;  other  pensions  refer  to
widows and survivor benefits.
For section 3 data are for population as a whole;  for Chile and Argentina from CELADE
(1998),  "American  Latina:  Proyecciones  de  Poblacion  1970-2050,"  Demographic
Bulletin 61; for Mexico  from Partida, Virgilio,  1998 (CONAPO, Mexico).
For section  4,  data refer  to  our  sample  and  sample  dates,  as described  in Appendix  B
(minimum wage, MPG and flat decline through time as %  of average  wage due to price
indexation).  In  Argentina  and  Mexico  there  is  no  social  welfare  program  targeted
towards the  elderly.  The Mexican  program  (Progresa)  is targeted  towards  families  with
children.
Argentinean  currency is converted to US$s at  1997 exchange rates,  1 for 1. In 2002, peso
fell to 25-30%  of US$,  so  wage  and pension  values  would be 25-30% of stated values.
Exchange rate for Chile was Ch$413.45=US$1  and in Mexico  8 pesos=US$1.
44¶able 3: E dmated Yeaira  of co  btnfdolmo  lby Age, Ede1ulom  momd Gemier
A.  ChITei
MlRes
Age  _  _  __  _  __
imeompRele  imtompRiete  ConepRete  unp to 4 poet  5+ yeani  post
prim  U  secomdairy  secoidaMry  seco_md_r_  _eco____
16 - 20  3.37  3.02  1.65  1.28  0.00
21 - 25  3.65  3.89  4.19  4.07  2.79
26 - 30  3.63  4.13  4.49  4.32  4.46
31  - 35  3.84  4.29  4.70  4.70  4.87
36 - 40  3.97  4.30  4.69  4.62  4.90
41 - 45  4.40  4.35  4.53  4.47  4.75
46 - 50  3.89  4.24  4.12  4.23  4.71
51 - 55  3.74  4.20  3.97  4.01  4.77
56- 60  3.03  3.32  3.70  3.83  4.66
61 - 65  2.46  2.31  2.25  3.34  3.06
Total 16-65  35.98  38.05  38.29  38.97  38.97
YenMnaRes
Age
16 - 20  3.64  2.85  1.39  1.21  0.00
21 -25  3.20  3.66  3.92  3.91  3.26
26 - 30  2.96  3.52  3.33  3.78  4.61
31 - 35  1.64  1.92  2.94  3.74  4.23
36 - 40  2.35  2.83  3.37  3.71  4.82
41  - 45  2.44  2.91  3.37  4.37  4.61
46 - s0  2.09  2.21  3.38  3.36  4.65
52 -55  2.54  2.331  2.47  3.44  4.63
56 - 60  1.63  1.85  2.38  4.16  3.96
61 - 65  0.93  0.11  0.25  0.24  1.28
Totall 16.65  23.42  24.17  26.80  32.92  36.05
Notes:
1. Based on labor force experience of a cross-section of adults in urban areas who
worked at some points and are affiliated to the social security system.
We  assume  that  the  "typical"  man  and  woman  within  each  schooling  category
accumulates  contributions  as  a  single  person  first,  gets  married,  and  continues  to
accumulate  contributions  as  a  married  person  afterwards.  The  marriage  age  for  the
"typical"  man and  woman  is  the  age  at  which  50% of the  corresponding  category  is
married.  See Appendix B for more details on data sources.
45B. Argentina'
Males
Age  Sch  _o_ine
Incomplete  Incomplete  Complete  up to 4 post  5+ year post
primary  secondary  secondary  secondary  secondary
16 - 20  3.25  2.33  3.85  1.67  0.00
21 - 25  3.94  4.53  4.53  3.17  4.69
26 - 30  4.27  4.78  4.85  4.39  4.92
31 - 35  4.20  4.87  4.93  4.73  4.94
36 - 40  4.66  4.75  4.89  4.97  4.90
41 - 45  4.68  4.80  4.87  4.94  4.89
46 - 50  4.54  4.68  4.86  4.86  4.93
51 - 55  4.29  4.51  4.42  4.64  4.81
56 - 60  3.86  3.99  3.96  3.88  4.65
61-65  1.24  1.41  1.66  1.89  2.08
Total 16-65  38.93  40.74  42.82  39.14  40.86
Females
A  ge  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
16 - 20  1.60  1.31  3.27  1.16  0.00
21 -25  1.11  2.44  4.32  2.92  4.58
26 - 30  1.87  1.91  2.22  3.72  4.63
31 - 35  2.10  2.30  2.62  3.61  4.31
36 - 40  2.32  2.47  2.65  2.89  4.18
41 -45  2.58  2.55  2.93  3.98  4.18
46 - 50  2.37  2.53  2.93  3.75  4.61
51 - 55  2.12  1.88  2.29  3.15  3.97
56 - 60  1.38  1.70  1.63  2.54  3.31
61  - 65  0.47  0.44  0.40  0.77.  1.34
Total 16-65  17.92  19.53  25.26  29.49  34.43
Notes:
1. Based on labor force experience of a cross-section  of adults in urban areas covering
most of the Argentine  population. On marital status see footnote for Chile. For data
sources see Appendix B.
46I $lnoolfin  J 
A  e:v  0-5  6-0  9  1012  13+
Mem  _  _
16-20  4.38  4.29  4.17  3.51  2.96
21-25  4.62  4.78  4.78  4.47  3.80
26-30  4.85  4.95  4.90  4.95  4.72
31-35  4.89  4.88  4.93  4.90  4.95
36-40  4.89  4.87  4.93  4.88  4.87
41-45  4.82  4.88  4.86  4.85  4.91
46-50  4.71  4.63  4.68  4.78  4.80
51-55  4.48  4.41  4.39  4.46  4.49
56-60  4.10  3.84  3.85  4.04  4.24
61-65  3.26  2.79  3.06  3.04  3.06
7ofrO  16-65:  45.00  44.33  44.55  43.89  42.83
Women_
Age:
16-20  3.44  3.99  3.89  3.64  3.23
21A25  1.55  1.50  2.55  3.72  3.85
26-30  1.90  1.70  1.90  2.30  3.65
31-35  2.57  2.02  2.10  2.42  3.40
36-40  2.30  2.23  2.42  2.73  3.26
41-45  2.34  2.24  2.60  2.59  3.49
46-50  2.07  2.05  2.05  2.54  3.41
51-55  2.11  1.65  1.81  1.75  2.81
56-60  1.57  1.39  1.74  1.65  2.32
61-65  1.08  1.17  0.79  - 1.00  2.29
lToRal  16- 65:  20.93  19.92  21.90  24.36  31.71
Nones:
Based on data from "more urban" areas defined as communities with 100,000 people or
more. On marital status see footnote for Chile. For data sources see Appendix B.
47Table 4:  Average Monthly  Wage by Age, Education and Gender
A. Chile-Urban areas (in 1994 US$'s)1
Males
AgeSchooling
incomplete  incomplete  Complete  up to 4 post  5+ year post
p__~rimary  secondary  secondary  secondary  secondary
16 - 20  $119  $150  $176  $184
21 - 25  148  176  215  288  $758
26 - 30  163  204  261  376  866
31 - 35  169  230  323  473  1,166
36 - 40  184  251  367  541  1,268
41  - 45  214  280  423  601  1,307
46 - 50  227  347  535  653  1,556
51 - 55  220  310  488  599  1,441
56 - 60  224  329  479  681  1,313
61 - 65  197  297  391  582  1,242
Females
16A-20  $117  $116  $152  $161
21 - 25  120  147  183  231  $433
26 - 30  129  143  200  405  561
31 - 35  128  160  220  315  629
36 - 40  126  169  260  334  737
41 - 45  141  192  332  435  756
46 - 50  147  202  326  506  514
51  - 55  152  183  379  374  537
56 - 60  154  227  408  363  686
60 - 65  142  152  283  381  883
Notes:
1 In 1994, US$1  = $413.45 Chilean.
Wage  estimates  are  for  full  time  workers  in  urban  areas.  Monthly  wages  would  be
somewhat  lower if part-timers were  included;  however,  most  affiliates  who work,  work
full time. For sources see Appendix B.
48oemopRete  AimccmpRele  ComIRel  e  MP to 4  q  0$6  R+  year post
gzmaCy  seecimisair  secomD2ftr  gesdC  ecomftiry
16 - 20  $177  $264  $314  $391
21 - 2§  314  425  466  504  $1,083
26 - 30  357  509  696  743  1,305
31 - 3§  461  599  854  961  1,635
36 - 40  427  612  992  1,126  1,847
41 - 4§  475  711  1,009  1,089  2,327
46 - s0  504  700  1,105  1,471  2,103
__  - §§  470  677  1,324  1,163  2,082
§6 - 60  457  707  833  821  2,014
61 - 6§  370  581  871  888  2,192
lFemngaRe
Age
16 - 20  $174  $207  $303  $238
21 - 25  200  304  366  433  $712
26 - 30  214  320  440  548  948
31 - 3§  315  348  620  586  965
36 - 40  339  385  638  647  985
4a - 4§  308  388  643  827  1,021
46 - s0  280  349  666  704  1,349
5H - §S  309  368  589  835  1,416
§6 - 60  264  369  684  593  967
60 - 65  249  360  1,114  982  1,630
Notes:
1.  In 1996, US$1  = 1$ Argentinean.  In 2002, US$1 = 3-4$Argentinian.
Wage estimates are based on all workers (both full time and part time) in metropolitan
areas. For sources see Appendix B.
49C. Average  Monthly Wage, Mexico-  More-Urban Area (in 1997 US$)'
Men  Years of education
Age  0-5  6-8  9  10-12  13+
16-20  $125  $131  138  142  162
21-30  172  186  212  262  392
3140  195  225  257  338  643
41-50  210  243  327  386  773
51-60  193  273  335  438  815
61-65  174  245  413  722  957
Women
16-20  $98  117  122  145  148
21-30  115  125  150  214  309
3140  113  134  175  267  420
41-50  109  172  210  293  478
51-60  117  156  184  350  513
61-65  92  109  _  3  1
Notes:
1 In 1997  1 US$ = 8 Pesos. Estimates are for average monthly wages received by
persons employed for pay in more urban areas in 1997.
2 Average in the cell obtained from fewer than 30 observations; numbers should
be used with caution.
50labiRe S.  EUmaEted Moimtlnlby Amnmnnites  fromm  fI  iM&AdUM  Acconlt$t
(]B3asedI  onn  §%  returim  Aia  accomullaDotiO  stage, 4%  l/m  &Dnrunihty  gte,  2%  rel2 wage growth)
ClniRe9 ¶996 1U$$
limeomplete  |lRIMCompRete  Copilnete  ULJp to 4 post  |+  yrs post
|przDnlry  |ecoodlary  |ecom  ary  | se¢oid1a1ry  |ecomdary
Avera  e mnrer edll  maRe
Amnmuty,  lA=65  $236  $342  1  $510  $710  $1,636
FemiaRe$
Average Temell$es,
IRA=60  76  (32%)  106  (31%)  186  (37%)  308  (43%)  565  (35%)
Average wommani  ff
RAD=65  112  (470/%)  152  (45%)  270  (53%)  445  (63%)  836  (51%)
FulHl creer
womra, RA-=65  172  (73%)  232  (68%)  376  (74%)  516  (73%)  888  (54%)
10-year woimam,
EAD=60  31  (13%)  42  (12%)  56  (11%)  89  (14%)  158  (10%)
AArgemtan9,1996  US$
neompDllete  McoMpllete  CompRete  1 Some post-  |  lmveirsEty
jpnriinry  j Seoinary  J  se¢oomuEy  secomiry  J  elegree
Average  mnmied  mmaleg
ASXERy,IRA=65  507  772 1 1,156  1,198  [2,319
YemlaRes
Average wommza,
1RA=60  107  (21%)  154  (20%)  304  (26%)  424  (35%)  830  (36%)
Average womaim ff
IEA=65  158  (31%)  227  (29%)  447  (39%)  624  (52%)  1217  (52%)
IFC, RA=65  342  (67%)  471  (61%)  770  (67%)  805  (67%)  1300  (56%)
10-yerT9  RA=60  54  (11%)  68  (9%)  63  (  5%)  106  (  9%)  200  (  9%)
Mcmo-nmior  Unibn, 11997 US$9 ]A=65 for  meim  iimd  women  m
_  10-§  F6-0  19  10-112  113+
Average mairrned  mafles
AiuAmty  | 216  1251  J309  1389  665
1Fenm&Rez
Average  womani  65  (30%)  77  (31%)  103  (33%)  166  (43%)  339  (51%)
FC womanm  135  (63%)  167  (67%)  205  (66%)  302  (78%)  464  (70%)
110-year womai  38  (18%)  43  (17%)  50  (16%)  66  (17%)  89  (13%)
For notes see Appendix B. MPG in Chile, flat benefit in Argentina and part of annuity from SQ
in Mexico  are  not  included  in this  table.  Numbers  in parentheses  give  average  female/male
ratio  of annuities  for  each  cell.  For  comparison,  poverty  line  was  $73  in  Chile,  $156  in
Argentina.
51Table 6A: Impact of public pillar on gender ratios of monthly pensions
Fast growth: 5% return in accumulation stage, 4% in annuity stage, 2%  real wage growth)
Education*  11  12  13  14  15
Chile, 1994 US$'s
Married Men
Annuity, RA=65  $2361  $3421  $510  $710  $1,636
% increase-MPG  0  O0  O  0  0
Women
Annuity, RA=60  $76  $106  $186  $308  $565
Annuity+MPG-av.  91  106  186  308  565
Ann.+MPG-av. if
wage-indexed  200  200  200  308  565
%  incr.-MiPG-av.  20%  0  0  0  0
% MPG if RA=65,
if FC or if 10-year  0  0  0  0  0
Average female/male ratios
Own-annuity  .32  .31  .37  .43  .35
Annuity + MPG  .39  .31  .37  .43  .35
-if wage-indexed  .85  .58  .39  .43  .35
Argentina,  1996 US$'s
Married men
Annuity, RA=65  $507  $772  $1,156  $1,198  $2,319
Annuity + flat  707  972  1,356  1,398  2,519
% increase by flat  40%  26%  17%  17%  9%
Women
Annuity, RA=60  $107  $154  $304  $424  $830
Annuity+red. flat  247  294  444  564  1030
% incr. by flat  131%  91%  46%  33%  24%
Average female/male  ratios
Own-annuity  .21  .20  .26  .35  .36
Ann. + flat (at 65)  .15  .16  .22  .30  .41
Ann. + flat (at 70)  .35  .30  .33  .40  .41
Mexico, 1996 US$'s
Married men
Own-ann.,  no SQ  216  251  |  309  |  389  |  665
Annuity incl. SQ  294  329  |  387  |  463  |  736
%increasebySQ  36%  31%  25%  19%  11%
Women
Own-ann., no SQ  651  77  103  166  339
Annuity incl. SQ  105j  117  148  216  396
% incr. by SQ  62%  52%  44%  30%  17%
Average female/male ratios
Annuity if no SQ  [  .30  .31  |  .33  |  .43  .51
Annuity incL SQ  .36  .36  .38  .47  .54
*See Table 5 for definition of 5 education categories. Public benefits begin at varying
ages.  MPG is converted to actuarially  equivalent monthly top-up. See Appendix B. In
Argentina average women in top education group receives full flat.
52IFble 6]B:  EnMpRIet  of punbec pfir  oln geomiieir  m  ranOe  oC  nm{oltilRy  peim$iOI
(Slow growtli: 3%  ireturirm i  accum nu]oatona stagp  2%  Im  Aninummaty sitge,  0% n/re&  wgoe
rowtln
Educalflom*  a  12  13  I'  Is
Maur7AOi  Men
Amuaety, RA=65  1  $821  1191  1781  2481  571
% amerease-AFsG  11%  0  0l  0°  0
Womme m
Anmuaty, RA=60  $28  $40  $70  $115  $212
Amnmut+MI?G-av.  91  91  91  115  212
Amm.+IMG;-v. if
WRe-Amdlezed  91  91  91  115  212
%  Amcr.-IPGN-av.  225%  128%  30%  0  0
% M1PG  ff  FC  50%  12%  O  O  0
_veiragige  enMiRe/M&lRe  aimos
Own-auMety  .341  .33  .39  .46  .37
Aminety +  +MPG  1.001  .76  .51  .46  .37
-ff wage-hndezed  1.00  .76  .51  .46  .37
Airgentdina,'  996  _$9$
Mairried men_
Annuty, RA=65  $177  $269  $402  $417  $807
Ainnihty + hat  377  469  602  617  1007
%  ficirease by  flXt  113%  74%  50%  48%  25%
Woemeim
ABaimmtys,  A=60  $40  $58  $114  $159  $311
Aimimuty+ired. fiat  180  198  254  259  511
%  ier.  by flat  350%  241%  123%j  88%  64%
_  Aenage ifeMgAe/ mERe  nraode  _
Ow__-______ty_  .23  .22  .28  .38  .39
Anmm. +  flat ((t 65)  .1I  .12  .19  .26  .51
Amin.  + flt (at 70)  .48  .42  .42  .48  .51
_ez_c_,  n996 UMJ'$'
1  __________  _  b  rMnailesl  miem
Ownm=annm.,noSQ  $79  $91  $112  |  $1411  $241
AmiautyOmdcLSQ  114  1261  147  |  174  I  273
%  mirease by SQ  - 44%  38%1  31%1  23%  |  13%
I________  Wom_e  _
OwEn-aimm.,  no SQ  24  291  38  61  124
Anmmnuty ALmd.  SQ  42  461  57  83  150
%  aimcir.  by SQ  75%  59%1  50%0  36%  21%
M  ASvenrge  if  nem  aRmRe  irnfts
Aimlhtyi  ff imo SQ  |  .30  .31  |  .34  I  .44  |  .51
AmnunAity  inmcA  SQ  J  .37  .36  .39  .47  .55
*See Table 5 for definition of 5 education categories. Public benefits begin at varying
ages.  MPG is converted to actuarially equivalent monthly top-up. See Appendix B. In
Argentina average women in top education  group receives full flat.
53Table  7.  PV  of  lifetime  benefits  from  own-annuities  and  lifetime  transfers  from
joint annuities and public pillar (US$000's)  1
r = 5%  during accumulation, 4% during annuity stage, real wage growth = 2%
Chile
Education*  Incomplete  Incomplete  Complete  Up to 4  University
primary  secondary  secondary  post sec.  degree +
Average man
Individual annuity  $53.7  $80.0  l $111.5  | $256.9
Joint annuity (if marr.)  - 4.8  - 7.0  -10.4  - 14.5  - 33.3
Women
Average woman
Own annuity  16.9  23.5  41.4  68.3  125.6
MPG  2.8  0  0  0  0
Jt. annuity (if married)  5.8  8.4  12.5  17.4  40.1
% mcr. due to MPG  17%  0  0  0  0
% incr. due to joint ann.  31%  36%  30%  25%  32%
Fuli Career woman
Own annuity  27.0  36.5  59.0  81.1  139.5
% incr. due to joint ann.  19%  23%  21%  21%  29%
10 year woman
Own annuity  6.9  9.3  12.4  21.4  35.0
% incr. due to joint ann.  84%  90%  100%  81%  114%
Argentina
| Incomplete  Incomplete  I Complete  |Some post- 1  University
primary  | secondary  I secondary  secondary  | degree
Average  man
Individual annuity  80.3  122.3  183.1  189.7  367.5
Flat  26.0  26.0  26.0  26.0  26.0
Joint annuity (if  marr.)  -14.3  -21.9  -32.7  -33.8  -65.7
% incr. from flat (marr.)  39%  26%  17%  17%  9%
Women
Average woman
Own-annuity  23.5  33.8  66.6  92.9  181.9
Flat  14.2  14.2  14.2  14.2  43.8
Jt. annuity (if married)  16.3  24.8  37.1  38.4  74.5
% incr. from flat  61%  42%  21%  15%  24%
% incr. fromjoint  ann.  69%  73%  56%  41%  41%
FC woman
Own annuity  52.7  72.6  118.7  124.1  215.7
Flat  30.8  30.8  30.8  30.8  30.8
% incr. from flat  58%  42%  26%  25%  14%
% incr. from joint ann.  31%  34%  31%  31%  35%
10 year woman
Own annuity  ,11.8  14.9  13.8  23.2  58.1
Flat  14.2  14.2  14.2  14.2  14.2
% incr. from flat  120%  95%  103%  61%  24%
% incr. from joint ann.  138%  167%  270%  165%  128%
54MIez®io
IEduioin  |  l0-5  6-0  9  10-112  |3+
__AveMra  M  nam
Individual annuity-no SQ  34.0  39.7  48.6  61.4  105.0
SQ  12.4  12.4  12.4  11.7  11.1
Joint annuity (if  married)  -5.7  -6.3  -7.4  -8.9  -14.2
% incr. from SQ  *41%  135%  29%  22%  12%
Womeim
Average woma_m
Own annuity if no SQ  10.1  11.9  15.9  25.7  52.5
SQ to own-account  6.2  6.3  6.9  7.8  9.0
Joint annuity (if marr.)2 6.4  7.2  8.4  10.1  16.1
%  incr. from SQ  62%  53%  44%  30%  17%
% incr. from joint annuity  64%  60%  53%  39%  31%
IFC womam  ''
Own annuity if no SQ  20.9  25.9  31.7  46.7  71.8
SQ  12.4  12.4  12.4  11.7  11.1
%  incr. from SQ  59%  48%  39%  25%  15%
% incr. from joint annuity  31%  28%  27%  22%  22%
10 year womaaim_
Own annuity if no SQ  5.9  6.7  7.7  10.2  13.8
SQ  4.7  4.8  5.1  5.3  5.3
% incr. from SQ  80%  72%  66%  52%  38%
% incr.  from joint annuity  109%  108%  109%  99%  117%
Notes:  Expected  age  of  death  of 65-year  old  cohort  is  used  in  these  calculations.
Husbands  and  wives  are  assumed  to  belong  to  the  same  educational  group.  Absolute
amount of joint annuity benefit is same for average,  full career and  10 year woman but it
varies  as  %  of own annuity.  Public pillar benefit varies  by labor force  attachment.  In
Chile  MPG  top-up  for married  woman stops  when MPG  floor  is reached  due  to joint
annuity. Therefore  % increment from MPG is less on lifetime than on monthly basis.  PV
of loss through joint annuity to  man is less  than PV  of joint annuity benefit to  woman
because  PV  is  measured  as of age  65,  which woman  reaches  3 years  later than  man.
Average man and FC and 10 year women get no MPG.  In Mexico part of the subtraction
to the husband and increment  to the wife from the joint annuity is due to the husband's
SQ.  SQ has much larger %  increment to  10 year woman  than to other women, because
that woman is assumed to work when she is young;  at that point the SQ is larger relative
to  the  wage  than  it becomes  later  on  due  to  price  indexation  of SQ  and  rising  age-
earnings profiles. Same factor leads % SQ to be slightly lower for full career woman.
55Table 8: The impact of joint annuities and unisex tables'
(r = 5% during accumulations,  4% during annuity stage, g = 2%)
Education  11  2  3  14  15
Chile
Males, retirin  at 65
Individual-gen. spec.  $271  $393  $586  $816  $1880
Individual-unisex  252  365  544  758  1746
Joint-gender  spec. 2 236  342  510  710  1,63f
Joint-unisex  236  342  509  7091  1,634
Females, retiring at 60  l
Individual-gen.spec.2 $76  $106  $186  $308  $565
Individual-unisex  80  111  196  324  595
Widow's benefit  142  205  306  426  982
Widow+own  218  311  492  734  1547
-%  of husband+wife  70%  70%  71%  72%  70%
Argentina
Males,  retirin  at 65
Individual-gen. spec.  617  940  1407  1458  2824
Individual-  unisex  562  856  1282  1328  2572
Joint--gender  spec.2 507  772  1156  1198  2319
Joint-unisex  518  789  1181  12251  2371
Females, retirig at 60
Individual-gen.spec.2 107  154  304  424  830
Individual-unisex  115  165  326  454  888
Widow's benefit  355  540  809  838  1623
Widow+own  462  694  1113  1262  2453
-%  of husband+wife  75%  75%  76%  78%  78%
Mexico
Males,  retirins  at 65
Individual-gen. spec.  $335  $375  $440  $528  $838
Individual-unisex  316  354  416  498  791
Joint-gender spec.2 294  329  387  463  736
Joint-unisex  296  331  389  466  740
Females, retiring at 65
Individual-gen.spec.2 105  117  148  216  398
Individual- unisex  111  124  156  228  419
Widow's benefit  177  198  232  278  441
Widow+own  282  315  380  494  839
-%  of husband+wife  71%  71%  71%  73%  74%
Notes:
1.  The  MPG and  flat are  not included  in this  table.  SQ is  included  since  it is part  of
annuity.  Life expectancy  is based  on national  averages;  full  mortality  tables are not
used.  Joint  annuity  assumes  60%  to  survivor.  Given  deterministic  assumptions,
woman would never purchase joint annuity.For education categories see Table  1A.
2.  Corresponds to own-pensions  in Tables 5 and 6 for Chile and Argentina,  own+SQ for
Mexico.
56T1ablle 9: Ilatioo of Er1peced  ?V'  of0 Post-Refoirrire form Liffetme  eemes
(relaRnve to irano ffor  Mmnrired1  menm fn top emengadomnm  grroup)
(r = 5%  during accumulation,  4% during annuity stage, real wage growth = 2%)
E1ulcaton*  i  11  2  |  3  4 
Avegir  Mnm
Married Man  1.31  _.  i .2  0.9j  1.0
Single Man  i  .5  j  1.  40  1.1  1.4 
Wom  _em
Average married  1.5  1.  1.0  0.9  1.0
Full career married  ___  __  1 .5  1.6  1.3
Full career single  1.5  1.5  1.2  1.30  1.0
Fen year marmed  1i.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.1
Omem  + wormenmAverage househol  1.4  1  .2  1.1  0.9  1.0
AU-emAitaml
Aveime e 1Xam
Married Man  1.5_  1.3  0.9  _1.0
Single Man  [_  _  1.5  1.  1.3  1.2
Womeua
Average married  ___  2.0  1.2  1.2  1.1
Full career married  2.1  2.0  1.6  1.4  1.3
Full career single  1.8  1.7  1.  1.2  1.0
Ten year married  2.5  2.2  1.  1.4  1.5
Menn  + womneonAverage household  1.8  1.6  1.0  1.1  1.1
Mestii¢t
Aveira  eMm
Married Man  1  1.5  1.  0.91  1.a
Single Man  1  _  1.7|  1.4  1.0]  1.1
Womeim
Average married  1.8  1.6  1.  1.1  1.0
Full career married  2.1  1.9  1.5  1.1  0.9
Full career single  2.4  2.4  1.8  1.2  1.0
Ten year married  1.6  1.5  1.  1.  1.2
Mem + womeEnAverage  household  1.8  1.6  1.3  1.0  1.C
Notes:  Includes  lifetime benefits  from own-annuity,  public pillar  and joint  annuity (for
married).  Each cell  i shows  (PVnew/PVold)i/(PVnew/PVold)k  where  (PVnew/PVold)  =
ratio  of present  value  of lifetime  benefits  in new vs.  old  systems  for  group  i.  This  is
nornalized  by  the  ratio  for  reference  group  k,  where  k=-married  men  in  highest
educational  category.  If the  number in  a  cell>l,  this  means  it  gained  more  than  top
married men. For educational  categories see Table IA. Bold indicates biggest gainers.
57Table 10: F/M ratios of expected PV of lifetime benefits in new vs. old systems
Education  1  2  3  4  5
Chile
Old system
Av.,  own pension  .66  .58  .91  .95  .74
Av.,  own+widow  .69  .62  .91  .95  .75
FC, own pension  .81  .71  .93  .68  .69
FC, own+widow  .81  .71  .93  .68  .69
10 yr, own+wid.  .44  .40  .37  .38  .32
New system
Ay, PV own ann.  .47  .44  .52  .61  .49
Av.,  own+MPG  .55  .44  .52  .61  .49
Av, own+MPG+jt.  .79  .68  .77  .88  .74
FC, own annuity  .73  .68  .74  .73  .54
FC, own+joint  1.02  .96  1.03  1.01  .80
10 yr, own+joint  .39  .38  .36  .40  .34
Argentina
Old system
Av., own pension  .16  .13  .4  .67  .75
Av.,  own+widow  .29  .26  .51  .75  .81
FC, own pension  .74  .60  .57  .81  .74
FC, own+widow  .76  .65  .63  .81  .76
10 yr, own+wid.  .29  .26  .26  .35  .29
New system
Av, PV own ann.  .3  .28  .37  .44  .53
Av.,  own + flat  .35  .32  .39  .50  .57
Av, own+flat+joint  .59  .57  .67  .80  .92
FC, own + flat  .79  .70  .72  .72  .63
FC,own+flat+joint  1.09  1.01  1.06  1.06  .98
10 yr, ann.+joint  .46  .43  .37  .42  .40
Mexico
Old system
Av.,  own pension  .35  .29  .26  .3  .53
Av., own+widow  .58  .53  .50  .54  .76
FC, own pension  .63  .54  .57  .66  .82
FC, own+widow  .86  .78  .80  .90  1.06
10 yr, own+wid.  .47  .43  .36  .30  .28
New system
Av,  own-no SQ  .30  .30  .33  .42  .5
Av.,  own incl. SQ  .35  .35  .37  .46  .53
Av, own+SQ+joint  .56  .56  .58  .68  .76
FC, own incl. SQ  .72  .74  .72  .80  .71
FC,own+flat+joint  .97  1.00  .98  1.07  .97
10 yr, ann.+joint  .42  .41  .40  .40  .34
Denominator is married man for rows with joint annuity; single man if no joint annuity.
58ApPnD1d1z A:  stirinfuom of SanMple  by scbooRmg  gimd  eRected  gages (o  % of  0rows)
C1ERLE-URBAN  AREAS
Age  lff ionMpRege  |omiep1eqe  |Seolmdury  |  years  posl|I+yn$  po$i-
jpindmgau,y  secoimd1ary  1  I59onily  I
31 - 35  12.85  28.04  31.94  14.76  12.41
46 - 50  34.64  16.23  23.43  13.63  12.07
61 - 65  56.92  12.76  17.86  4.39  8.07
Total  126.33  24.53  26.45  114.07  8.62
IY EM  A LIES__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
31 - 35  9.01  22.21  33.21  23.13  12.43
46 - 50  35.45  16.33  20.1  17.67  10.45
61 - 65  64.76  8.49  13.69  7.68  5.38
Total  24.58  19.09  26.61  20.88  8.84
ARGENTENA-FULL  LAIOR FORCE
imeonimpRete  ]EcomIpRete  Somme post.  UVeIrsy
Age  pirnAmiry  secoad1%mry  Secondg1ry  secoindIairy  degree
MALLES
31-35  7.18  49.70  19.78  14.65  8.7
46-50  15.1  51.60  14.24  10.01  9.05
61-65  24.28  52.01  12.40  5.27  6.04
Total  11.65  52.95  17.00  12.37  6.03
IFEMALES
31-35  5.93  36.21  19.04  28.48  10.34
46-50  13.88  42.80  17.51  15.07  10.74
61-65  34.04  46.78  8.30  8.78  2.11
Total  9.88  40.65  18.61  23.58  7.29
_  _MEMlCO-MOIE-U1RIBAN  AREAS
Age  10§ yearrs  1syeairs  ¢  yeau$  102 Yeus
M  A LES  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
31 - 35  8.49  21.85  20.23  23.33  26.10
46 - 50  20.66  29.55  11.61  13.43  24.75
61 - 65  43.48  32.97  5.71  6.70  11.14
Total  13.75  25.68  18.78  19.69  22.09
FEMALLES
31 - 35  9.60  20.22  12.61  28.79  28.78
46 - 50  22.45  32.24  8.42  23.35  13.54
61 - 65  57.50  17.86  3.13  (a)  7.31  (a)  14.20  (a)
Total  14.35  22.47  13.79  *28.42  20.97
(a) Estimated on cell sample size < 30.
59Appendix B on data sources and methodology
Tables 3 and 4.  The Chile estimates  are based on CASEN 94,  a nationally representative
survey that provides information  on current labor force participation,  working status, affiliation to
social  security  and  contributory  status.  The  estimates  used  are  based  on  the  urban  sample-
approximately  100,000  individuals  age  16  or  older.  The  work  patterns  reported  are  those  of
affiliates (workers who have contributed at some point) in urban areas. The self-employed are not
required to contribute. Our data indicate  that 73% of all male workers  and 55%  of female workers
affiliate  (most  of the  others  are  self-employed)  and  90%  of male  affiliates  (91%  of women
affiliates) who are employed  contribute to social security. Thus,  in Chile  our estimates are  close
to  the  behavior  of the  average  affiliate  but  do  not  apply  to  women  who  never  worked  in the
formal labor market.  Work experience  is estimated  based  on current employment  of affiliates.
Wages reflect  pay for full time work (most work is full time, or 35 hours per week,  in Chile). For
some  analyses data on the distribution of wages within  each cell were used to estimate dispersion
of pension accumulations for that cell.
The Argentine  data are based on the micro data set of the Encuesta Nacional  de Gastos de
los  Hogares  (ENGH)  for  1996-97,  a  nationally  representative  household  survey.  The  sample
contains  103,858  individuals,  of whom 69,895  were  16 years  or older.  All regions  covered are
considered urban. Our data do not allow us to distinguish between affiliates  and non-affiliates  or
between  full  timers  and part timers.  In  Argentina  all workers,  including  the self-employed,  are
supposed  to  affiliate  and  contribute.  From other  sources,  we  know that  90%  of private  sector
workers  and  50%  of public  sector  workers  were  affiliated  in the  mid  1990's  but  the over-all
contribution rate is only 50%  of employment  in urban areas (compared  with 68% in Chile). Thus
some work years may be non-contributing  years.  Work experience is estimated based on current
employment  status of urban population,  including both  full  time  and part time workers.  Wages
reflect  pay  for  full  time  and  part  time  work,  hence  understate  the  true  full  time  wage  rate.
Because  we  cannot  distinguish  between  non-affiliates  and  affiliates,  who  have  a  higher labor
force participation  rate, we probably understate  the labor force attachment of affiliates. However,
we probably overstate contributions of affiliate when working, because of the 50% evasion rate.
The Mexican  data come from the  1997 Mexican National Employment Survey (ENE-97)
completed  by INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografla e Informnitica), the Mexican
Statistical Bureau.  The sample contains  information on 119,405 individuals aged  12 or older. We
use the sub-sample corresponding to more-urban  areas (communities of 100,000 people or more),
which  is  about  78%  of the  sample.  This  survey  contained  the  standard  employment  survey
questions, plus a module with employment history and job training  questions.  The ENE97  does
not allow for the identification  of social  security affiliates (about 42% of the economically active
population)  and/or  the  contributions  made  to  retirement  plans.  Work  experience  is  estimated
based on current employment  (both part time  and full time) of more-urban population in relevant
age-education  cells.  Wages reflect  pay  for full  time and part  time work in each cell.  For some
analyses  we used the observed coefficient of variation on earnings  for each cell as an estimate of
the distribution of years worked and resulting annuity within that cell.
Using these  cross-sectional  statistical  data,  we  divided  men  and  women  into  gender-age-
education-mantal  status  cells.  A typical  cell,  for example,  might consist of all married women
with high school  degree age  30-35. For each cell we obtained the average employment rates and
wage rates for the current population.  Data on marital  state enabled  us to identify the age,  M, at
which the probability of being married > 50%. In constructing our synthetic men and women, we
used the  employment  probability  and wage  rate  of the  single individual  up to  age  M,  and the
married  individual  after  age M.  The  labor  force  participation  rate of women  typically  declined
sharply  when they  got married.  In  some (high  education  older age)  cells  the number of single
women is very small so we could not profile women who remained single throughout life.
Table 5.  We assumed that for each educational  level, an average  man  or woman  who enters
the  labor  force  today proceeds  through  life  with  the age-specific  employment  probabilities and
60wage  rates  that  were  derived  from  the  cross-sectional  data.  For  simulations  where  positive
economy-wide  wage  growth  was  assumed,  we  multiplied  the  age-specific  wage  rate  by  the
projected  growth  factor.  For  all  three  countries  our  simulations  use  three  different  labor
attachment  pattems  for  women:  "Full  career  women"  are  those  who  have  same  labor  force
participation  rates and retire at same age  (65) as men. "10-year women"  are women who work
only 10 years, early in their adult lives, before children are born. "Average women" have average
work and wage for each education cell. "Average women if RA=65"  are women who  start their
annuity at age 65 but have same work experience as average women.
Contributions  and  fund  accumulations  are  based on  estimated  annual  earnings  and  work
experience  for  each  age-education-gender  cell.  In  baseline,  real  rate  of wage  growth  is  2%
annually  and rate  of return is 5%  during accumulation  stage,  4% during payout stage.  All work
years  are  treated  as  contributing  years  although  this  probably  overstates  accumulations.
Annuitization  upon  retirement  is  assumed.  Gender-specific  mortality  tables  are  used.  Joint
annuity  with  60%  to  survivor  (70%  in  Argentina)  is required  for married men  who  annuitize.
Wives  are  assumed to be  3  years  younger than  and have  3-4 year  longevity  greater than their
husbands.  In Chile males retire at age 65, survive  for 15.5 years and purchase a joint annuity that
covers their wives for an additional 6.4 years. Females retire at age 60, survive for 22.8 years and
purchase  individual  annuities.  In Argentina  men at age 65 survive  14.5  years  and joint annuity
covers their wives for another  7 years. Women  survive for  22.5 years at age 60.  In Mexico both
men  and  women  retire  at  65.  Male  and  female  life  expectancies  at  65  are  15.8  and  18.5,
respectively, Women collect joint annuity for 5.7  years. Pesos are converted into $'s according to
1994  rates  for  Chile  (413/1),  1996  for  Argentina  (1/1)  1997  for Mexico  (8/1).  In  Argentina,
current  rate  of exchange  is  only  25-30%  as  much  as  1996  rate,  so  would  yield  much lower
annuities.
Table 6: Own-annuities  are  from Table 2. Chile's MPG was $91  in 1994, starting at age 65
for men,  60 for women. Twenty years of contributions  are required for eligibility.  Currently it is
formally price-indexed,  but ad hoc adjustments have been made that keep it roughly on par with
wage growth. If it became wage-indexed it would rise to $200 in 40 years.  In Table 3 the MPG is
converted  to an  actuarially  equivalent  monthly top-up,  although  in reality retirees must use up
their own accumulation by withdrawing an amount equal to the MPG monthly, and then get the
full $91  from the state after they run out of money. The flat benefit in Argentina is $200, starting
at age 65 for men and 60 for women. The reduced flat is $140, starting  at age 70. These benefits
are price-indexed. In Argentina 30 years of contributions are required for the full flat and 10 years
for the reduced  flat. The full filat is received by the average male and full career woman in every
educational  category.  The 10-year woman and average woman get only the reduced flat, except at
the top educational  level,  where she  meets the years of service  requirement.  Mexico's SQ  is a
uniform payment by the government into each worker's account per day worked. It is 5.5% of the
minimum wage or 2.2% of the average wage, indexed to prices. All workers are  eligible. Payouts
start at age 65.
61Appendix  C.  Estimated  fund  accumulations  by  decile,  gender  and  schooling,
Chile*  (estimated accumulations  given for deciles that do not meet MPG target)
Baseline (r =5% during accumulation  stage, 4% during annuitization, g = 2%)
Incomplete  Incomplete  |Secondary  [up to 4years  imore than 4
|Primary  |Secondary  I  [Post Sec  |years post sec
Men at 65: MPG Target-$5,432,000-  All deciles met MPG target
Women at 60: MPG Target = $6,605,000
1st decile  $2,640,371  $3,583,689  $5,581,615
2 d  decile  $4,187,835  $5,351,228
3d decile  $5,083,753  $6,298,100
4th  decile  $5,793,417  l
5th decile  $6,267,6081
Women at 65: MPG Target =  $5,9 26,000
1st decile  1  $3,451,569  $4,580,4621 
2u decile  $5,467,4251 
Slow growth scenario (r = 3%, g = 0)
t__________  Men at 65: MPG Target = $6,468 000
l1t decile  $3,582,019  $4,550,527  $5,579,140
2" decile_  $4,788,407  $5,501,859
3 decile  $5,309,888  $6,312,167
4t  decile  $5,952,367  _
Women at 60: MPG Target = $8,018,000
1  st decile  $1,212,817  $1,647,376  $2,564,196  $3,927,087  $7,669,210
2  decile  $1,923,563  $2,458,496  $3,357,370  $5,250,964
3d decile  $2,334,777  $2,893,717  $3,925,008  $6,500,917
4th  decile  $2,661,036  $3,204,034  $4,505,003  $7,588,586
5 ?  decile  $2,878,844  $3,543,527  $5,390,867
6?  decile  $3,196,751  $4,030,192  $6,408,994
7 th decile  $3,665,575  $4,808,575  $7,402,749
8t  decile  $4,299,426  $5,371,6441
9 decile  $5,076,339  $7,165,5661
Women at 65: MPG Target =  $ 7,000,000
1st decile  $1,439,545  $1,912,497  $3,015,529  $4,655,162
2d decile  $2,280,273  $2,851,713  $3,936,752  $6,189,899
3d decile  $2,773,762  $3,356,664  $4,601,668
4t  decile  $3,168,764  $3,718,733  $5,291,210
5t  decile  $3,421,263  $4,112,709  $6,318,169
6t  decile  $3,803,227  $4,679,214
7th  decile  $4,356,189  $5,581,573_
8th decile  $5,118,443  $6,240,895
1tb decile  $6,052,656
* MPG target is accumulation  that yields  annuity higher than MPG  and therefore  makes
top-up  unnecessary.  Accumulation  dispersion  estimates  are  based  on  actual  wage
dispersion and average  labor force participation rates.
62Appemm1  DO: Ipeirsoim Im  Years of Ezpeeimee  imd EgMIfiuty  ffoir MHG  in Me zco
(%  under MPG eligibility requirement, by schooling level )1
BaseRlie  seemar o  ureaRl  nmte rest rete = §%,  ireal  wgE  growth = 2%
Yesirs of seiool  0-§  6-0  _0=12  113+
Men_
Memn exjperience  45  44.3  44.6  43.9  42.8
% uideir  0years  0  0  0  0  0
% nnmder20 yearo  0  0  0  0  .1
%under 2§  yeairs  0  .1  0  .2  1.
% eUlgMble  for M]?¢G  100  99.9  100  99.8  99
% owM-aMImety  0  0  0  0  0
<M  MMiinun  peMsaon
2
WonDen
Meean  ezjerneimee  20.9  19.9  21.9  24.4  31.7
%  unmderi  10 years  25.5  28.5  24.5  16.8  5.9
%  imimder 20 years  47.8  50.2  45.6  38.5  19.9
% unmder 25 vyears  59.7  61.5  57.1  51.7  31.4
%  eflgEfle for MIP¢  40.3  38.5  42.9  48.3  68.6
%  owIMn-annSuity  47  43  34  19  4
<miRnnmnm  pensiomn 2
Notes:
1. Dispersion  is calculated  using  coefficients  of variation  of the  accumulated  years  of
experience for women and men, ages 61-65,  from ENE97, more urban areas.
2.  MPG = US$99  in  1997 US$'s.  Own-annuity is estimated using  assumptions given  in
Table 5, for given years  of experience.  Probably there is a positive correlation  between
years  worked  and size  of own-annuity,  so  those  whose  own-annuity  are  less than the
minimum pension  are likely to be included among those who worked  less than 25  years
and are therefore ineligible  for the MPG top-up.
63Appendix E: Old system formula in Mexico
NOTE:  OLD  SYSTEM
The annual retirement pension is based on:
a)  base amount given by a percentage of the income earned  during the last 5 years of contribution,
b) an increase for each  additional year contributed,  and
c) the number of years of contribution  in excess of the minimum  10 year requirement.
The value of the annual pension is calculated  according to the following expression:
S * [(CB) + (Y)*  (Al) ]
S= base salary used for the last 5 years of contribution
Base%=  percentage of base salary in base amount
Y= additional years contributed  beyond the 10 year requirement
Al=  annual increment as % of S, for each additional year contributed  beyond  10 years.
In addition, the IMSS provides retirees with a yearly bonus equivalent to
one month of the pension payment they were receiving.
Thus the total annual amount received would be
13/12 of the value obtained by the expression given above.
Base%  and Al are rates determined in a table (IMSS,  1993), which vary according to the
amount  S expressed in number of minimum  wages. The Base%  is inversely related to S,
and ranges from  80%  to 13%.  The annual increment,
Al, is directly related to S, and ranges from  0.563% to 2.45%.
Below we provide an example of the calculation for levels S of 1 and 6 minimum  wages,
assuming a total of 30 years of contribution to IMSS.
S  Base%  Al  Y  Estimated  annual pension
1 minimum  wage  80%  0.56%  20  13/12*  S * (96.9%)  =105%
6 minimum  wages  13%  2.45%  20  13/12*  S * (86.5%)  =93.7%
Replacement  rates  of base  salary  range between  94%  and  105%  for high  and  low wage
worker,  respectively,  who  has  worked  for  40  years.  For  10  years  of work  these
replacement rates would be 14% and 87%, respectively.
64]Fiinire 1:  e  Male  imirnmues  fnromn 1D)C anire more tDinm  'fi  Re  1  emone M  UnUMfes
(based on private contributions;  does not include any public benefits)
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65Figure 2: Low earners, especially women, get biggest %  increment from
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72Endmotes
The Latin  American  studies  were  part of a joint project  carried  out by James,  Cox-
Edwards and Wong. For earlier papers coming out of this project see CoxEdwards (2002,
2001a,b,c,  2000a,b),  Parker and Wong  (2001), Wong and Parker (2001). Other papers
have  discussed  the  projected  replacement  rates  of  men  and  women  in  Chile  and
Argentina,  but none have  systematically used actual labor market behavior to construct
expected  annuities  plus  public  benefits  under  the new  systems  and  compare  this with
defined  benefits  under  the  old  systems.  See  Bertranou  (2001),  Arena  de  Mesa  and
Montecinos  (1999), Barrientos (1998).  Bertranou (1998) reviews the earlier literature.
2  A small number of industrialized countries view pensions as a universal entitlement
based only on age and residence and usually financed by general revenues. These are
discussed briefly in Part VIII. This paper focuses on contributory schemes, where the
contributions are employment-related.
3  Some DB plans are structured  to grant generous pensions for partial  years of work and
give credit for child-rearing  years, which yields  more equal years credited  and therefore
pensions.  In DC systems the state could, if it wished, subsidize these activities by placing
a specified  amount  into  the DC accounts  for  child-rearing  years.  This would  make the
cost explicit (in contrast to DB plans where the costs are implicit and hidden). Perhaps for
this reason,  few DC plans provide this subsidy.
4  The  gender gap  in work and pay is smaller,  but  still  significant,  in higher  income
countries.  For  example,  in the  US, UK,  Canada  and  Australia  the  female  labor  force
participation rate is 15-25% below that of men (and much of that is part time) and hourly
wage rates  for women  are  15-30%  less than that  of men  (Ginn et al 2001,  US General
Accounting Office  1997).
5 Chile also offers a non-contributory social assistance program called PASIS, which pays
about 50% of the MPG, funded out of general revenues.  This is designed to keep out of
poverty the elderly who are not eligible for contributory benefits. The vast majority of its
recipients  are women living in rural areas. The number of eligible applicants exceeds the
available money, so a long waiting list has developed.
6  INFONAVIT  has  rarely  provided  a positive  real  rate of return,  but  the  hope of the
reformers was that this would change in the future. In our simulations we assume a 0 real
return.
7 Specifically, using available  cross-sectional  statistical data, we divided men and women
into gender-age-education-marital  status cells.  A typical cell, for example, might consist
of all married women with high school degree age 30-35. For each cell we obtained  the
average employment rates  and wage rates for the current population.  We then assumed
that  for  each  educational  level,  an  average  man  or woman  who  enters  the  labor  force
today proceeds  through  life with  the  age-specific  employment  probabilities  and  wage
rates  that  were  derived  from the  cross-sectional  data.  For  simulations  where  positive
73economy-wide  wage growth was  assumed,  we  multiplied  the age-specific  wage rate  by
the projected  growth  factor.  Contributions  depend on these  employment  histories.  Data
on  marital  state  enabled  us  to  identify  the  age,  M,  at  which  the  probability  of being
married > 50%.  In constructing  our synthetic men and women,  we used the employment
probability and wage rate of the single individual up to age -M  and the married individual
after age M.  Table  3 shows that  a  sharp  decline  in the labor force  participation  rate  of
women typically occurred when they got married.
8 In  the  US  and  European  contexts,  where  portfolio  choice  might  be  greater,  it  has
sometimes  been  argued that women will be  more conservative  investors than men.  For
examples of the mixed evidence on this point in the US context,  see US GAO (1997) and
Burnes  and Schulz  (2000.  The restrictions  on portfolios  in Latin America  preclude  this
and also mean that moral hazard with respect to investment choice is not a big problem in
the face of a minimum pension guarantee in Chile.
9 In reality most adjustments  to insolvency were not distributionally neutral. For example,
inflation  with  indexation  applied  only  to  a  minimum  pension  hurts  high  eamers
disproportionately,. while raising the  payroll tax  rate  subject  to  a  fixed  maximum hurts
low eamers,  and equalizing retirement ages  for the two genders hurts  women, especially
in  a DB plan.  An infinite number of such  reforms,  with divergent  distributional  effects,
are  possible  and many have  been used in  different  countries.  Each of these parametric
non-neutral reforms could then be compared with a distributionally neutral reform, as we
do here for the multi-pillar reforms that were actually chosen in these countries.
10 Our sample of workers grows small and selective, hence less representative  for workers
over  the  age  of 60,  especially  in the  higher  educational  categories.  Hence,  the  wage
numbers in these cells must be viewed with caution.
1  I However,  this is not necessarily good news for women. The lower pensions that obtain
for everyone  under slow growth imply that many women receive own-pensions  that  lie
well below the poverty line.
12 To illustrate the relative costs: If 30% of all workers  get the MPG and the top-up from
the public pillar is 33% of the lifetime guaranteed level for these workers,  the MPG costs
only  10%  as  much  as a  flat benefit,  where both  are  set  at the  same percentage  of the
average wage and have the same eligibility requirements.  For example, if the dependency
rate is 2/1 so a wage-indexed flat benefit that is 25% of the average wage will cost 12.5%
of payroll,  an equivalent  MPG  will cost  only  1.25%.  To partially  counteract  its higher
costs,  Argentina  sets  higher  eligibility  conditions  that  exclude  many  women  and  has
price-indexed  the- flat  benefit.  In  view of its  lower cost,  Chile has  been  able to  wage-
index the MPG on an ad hoc basis.
13  Workers whose accumulations  do not allow them to purchase  an annuity that exceeds
the MPG level must use up their own accumulations-by  withdrawing  an amount equal to
the  MPG  monthly.  When  they  run  out  of money  the  state  provides  the  MPG.  For
74purposes of our discussion we convert  the  expected value of the lifetime  state payment
into an actuarially equivalent monthly top-up.
14 Of course, all workers  are not "average"  with respect to wage rates and years worked.
When we take wage dispersion  into account we find that half of all women with primary
education and one third of women with incomplete secondary education receive a top-up
from the MPG in the baseline situation.  For most of these,  the  top-up accounts  for 10-
20% of their final pension. However, virtually no men will have own-pensions below the
MPG floor because of  their longer years of work (Appendix Table C).
15  Some  analyses of the  Chilean  scheme  have  ignored  the crucial  role of the MPG in
setting an income floor for low paid women who work part time with time out for child-
rearing.  See,  for  example,  Evans  and  Falkingham  1997,  who  understate by  50%  the
benefit such women will receive, because the MPG is ignored.
16  The moral hazard problem is much smaller for men, because most men are far ahead
of the MPG level, due to their higher wages and full careers.
17  Note  that raising the retirement  age  (without  additional  work) does  not increase  the
present value of lifetime  retirement income of women;  it simply shifts consumption to
later  ages.  In fact,  to the  degree that this  policy reduces  access  to the MPG,  it actually
decreases  total retirement  income for low earning women and increases the gender gap in
lifetime pensions. In this sense, the MPG and a higher retirement age are alternative ways
of raising  the monthly  level  of female benefits  to socially  acceptable  levels, with very
different  distributional  and fiscal  consequences.  This policy would save the government
money,  which could be spent to compensate  the losing group  and other women in other
ways.
18  Whether price or wage  indexation of the public benefit is preferable  depends,  in part,
on how high it is to begin with and how great is the moral hazard problem. In Argentina
and Mexico it started  at a much higher level than in Chile, and goes to many more people
since it is an add-on to all rather than a selective top-up, so drawing costs down relative
to  revenues  through  price  indexation  may be more  necessary  than in  Chile,  for  fiscal
sustainability.  But  the  structure  of  Chile's  MPG  entails  greater  moral  hazard  than
Mexico's work-related  social quota and possibly more than Argentina's flat.
19 The fact that the MPG insures against low investment returns was probably a means of
winning political  acceptance  for the new Chilean system, when it introduced  the multi-
pillar  system  concept  in  1980.  This insurance  might  pose  a moral  hazard problem-
workers  accept  risky  investments  because  they  know  they  will  be  protected  on  the
downside  by  the  MPG.  However,  given  the  limited  portfolio  choice  allowed  by
regulations  in Chile until now, moral hazard concerning  risky investment has not been a
danger.  Instead,  it appears  that a major  consequence  of the  MPG  is  to  provide  inter-
generational  insurance  against  prolonged  periods of low interest  rates.  The  minimum
75pension remains at the same  fixed level even during a depression,  so the top-up  from the
public pillar increases at these times.
20 At age  65,  pensions  for these women, based exclusively  on their  own-annuities,  are
only  15-30%  those of men.  They are relatively  lower  than in Chile because  wages  and
employment  are less  equal  than  in Chile,  and  lower than in Mexico  because retirement
age is equalized  for men and women in Mexico.
21  These  conclusions  are  reinforced  when  we examine  data  on dispersion  in  projected
pensions stemming from variations  in labor force participation  rates.  Fewer than 1% of
all men would be  excluded by eligibility rules but practically none of them have  own-
pensions below the MPG. In contrast,  about 30% of all women have own-annuities below
the MPG, but they probably overlap with the 60%  who fail the eligibility test (Appendix
Table D).
22  That is, using the expected  future  lifetime of the average man and woman, we add up
the projected public  and private benefits,  discounted  at 4%  in the baseline case and 2%  in
the slow.growth case.  In this analysis we calculate the present value, as of age 65, of the
sum of discounted benefitsfrom  the actual age of retirement until expected age of death.
In effect,  we examine  a person who  lives until age  65 and therefore  has the expected  age
of death of the  age' 65 retiree,  even if she actually retired  at an earlier age.  We take into
account all years of actual retirement.
23 SQ yields a slightly higher rate of return to the 10 year woman, because that woman is
assumed  to work when  she is young;  at that point the  SQ is larger relative  to the wage
than it becomes later on due to price indexation.
24  Consistent  with this interpretation,  wives and  single men  are not required  to purchase
joint  annuities.  For quantification  of these  non-monetary  household  services  see Apps
2002.
25 In several European countries marriage is becoming the exception rather than the norm.
However, in some countries partners are required to register  even if not married and joint
annuities could be applicable then.  Additional problems may occur in the case of divorce.
For the reasons we have just discussed,  legal arrangements  for the  splitting of retirement
accounts  and the continuation of joint  annuities are important in such cases.  While half
the marriages  end in divorce in some  countries,  at present the  divorce  rate is relatively
low in Latin America and it is prohibited in Chile  (although marriage can be "nullified"
in Chile).  It  should also  be noted  that for families  that  Would have  saved  optimally for
widows in other ways,  the joint annuity might  crowd  out this  voluntary  saving.  To  the
extent that such households  exist, our numbers overstate the incremental  income to wife
and the decreased  consumption  of the husband  brought  about by  the joint annuity.  For
evidence that the savings and insurance  behavior of households indicates that they do not
engage in consumption smoothing over the wife's lifetime, see Bemheim et al. (2003).
7626  In the  largest component  of Chile's  fragmented  old system,  the  Servicio  de  Seguro
Social (SSS),,  a = 5%  for the first ten years  and  1% thereafter,  so the old system paid
50% of pensionable salary for the first ten years of work. The pensionable salary was the
average of the last 5 years of work, of which the last 3 years were indexed up according
to inflation.  In Argentina, the old system paid (a) the JO--70% of base salary for 20 years
of contributions  with an  additional  1% for every year  over 30 or  (b) the  JEA--50%  of
base + an additional  1% for every year over 10 for those who contributed for 10-20 years.
Base salary was defined as the average of the best three out of the last ten years of wages,
with no indexation. Women qualifying for (a) could retire early at age 55, men at 60, but
(b)  started  at age  65.  A minimum  pension  further  protected  women  after  ten years  of
contributions.  In Mexico, the old system paid a proportion of the base salary for the first
ten years  plus  an  increment  for  every  year  over  ten,  where  the  base  salary  was  the
average  of earnings during  the last 250 working  weeks.  The  proportion of base varied
negatively with wages, ranging from  13%  for high earners to 80% for low earners.  The
accrual  rate  for  additional  years  varied  positively  with  wages,  ranging  from  .56%  to
2.45% per year. Moreover,  the monthly pension was paid for 13 months instead of 12. A
minimum  pension  tied  to  the  minimum  wage  was  also  applied  after  ten  years  of
contributions (see Appendix E for precise formula and arithmetic example).
27  Data in this section are from  Castel and Fox (2001)  and Woycicka (2001).  These data
were  augmented  by personal  communications  with Agnieszka  Chlon,  who  carried  out
simulations  for  Poland,  and  Paulette  Castel,  who  did  simulations  for  several  other
countries.
28  A recent  simulation  of the UK  system  and  its proposed  reforms  comes  to  similar
conclusion  as  our paper  about  the  importance  of the  redistributive  public  benefit  for
women,  the fact  that  its equalizing  impact  will diminish  through time because  it isn't
wage-indexed,  and the need  to include  strong survivors'  benefits,  as in joint annuities.
(Falkingham  and Rake 2001).
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